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vABSTRACT 
A successful attack on a hazardous materials storage facility has the potential to 
cause mass casualties and panic.  There are approximately 15,000 such facilities across 
the country that handle these toxic and flammable substances at levels exceeding 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory thresholds.  Although the risk and 
consequences vary greatly among these sites, there are a significant number of facilities 
with tens of thousands of individuals who live and work in the vulnerability zone.  Until 
P.L. 109-125 was enacted on October 4, 2006, which required the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to issue interim final regulations establishing risk-based 
performance standards, the Federal government policy for securing chemical facilities 
from terrorist attack relied entirely upon voluntary actions by industry. 
Though it is sure to create controversy, this thesis proposes the need for new 
regulations that secure the chemical industry from terrorist attack.  We propose new 
legislation that mandates standards for chemical industry security yet also addresses the 
economic and implementation issues associated with a typical command and control 
structure.  DHS, in close partnership with the EPA, is best suited to undertake this 
responsibility.  In addition, State delegation of oversight responsibility is necessary to 
address the resources required to handle such a large number of sites.  The facilities of 
concern are those subject to the EPA Risk Management Program.  Public participation in 
terms of information sharing, preparedness exercises, and protective actions is vital to 
reduce the fear and anxiety inherent to acts of terrorism.  Inherently Safer Technology 
evaluations are recommended for the chemical facilities of concern through regulatory 
amendments to the Clean Air Act Section 112. 
It is imperative that States retain the ability to be more restrictive, as warranted, to 
ensure that preparedness is measured in line with potential vulnerabilities.  A one size fits 
all standard is not practical across our diverse nation.  A minimum standard set by DHS 
will ensure a level playing field for the chemical industry with the understanding that 
jurisdictions with unique vulnerabilities have the ability to implement stricter standards to 
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1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
In September 2003 the New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force 
(Task Force) approved Security Best Practices (SBPs) for the chemical sector.  The core 
of the SBPs is the American Chemistry Council Security Code.  The SBPs are voluntary 
guidelines that were developed in a collaborative effort between industry, state 
government, and law enforcement officials.  Inspections conducted by the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) revealed that seventy five percent of 
the sector have completed a security vulnerability assessment (SVA) and implemented 
the recommendations resulting from the SVA.  It is important to note that the NJDEP did 
not review the SVAs and therefore could not make any conclusions as to their quality.  
The NJDEP held an Interested Party Review public hearing on December 1, 2005 to 
solicit comments on the existing SBPs.  Representatives from industry, employee worker 
unions, environmental groups, and security consultants submitted comments to the 
NJDEP. 
In order to determine compliance with the SBPs, the Task Force approved Best 
Practice Standards (Standards) on November 21, 2005 signed by the Attorney General, 
Chairman of the Task Force, and the Commissioner of the NJDEP as the Chemical Sector 
liaison.  The Standards apply to facilities that are subject to New Jersey’s Toxic 
Catastrophe Prevention Act or Discharge Prevention, Containment and Countermeasure 
program and report under certain Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) or North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes related to the chemical 
industry.  The Standards cover 157 chemical facilities and require each site to examine 
vulnerabilities and hazards that might be exploited by potential terrorists.  The 157 
facilities do not encompass all of the chemical facilities in New Jersey but rather include 
all of the sites storing or handling hazardous substances exceeding NJDEP regulatory 
threshold quantities. These assessments must be conducted by a qualified security expert 
and employ a methodology that has been approved by the American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers’ Center for Chemical Process Safety.  The SVAs must include, at a minimum, 
consideration of:  
2• Access and security provisions on the facility grounds (including regular 
testing and maintenance of security systems); 
• Existing or needed security measures outside the perimeter of the facility 
(whether or not in the facility’s control) that would reduce vulnerabilities 
to an attack on the facility; 
• Employee and contractor background checks and other personnel 
measures; 
• Information and cyber security; and 
• Storage and processing of potentially hazardous materials. 
The Standards also require the development of a prevention, preparedness, and 
response plan that identifies: the implementation status of all SBPs, based on its degree of 
security risk; and all other measures that have been implemented or are planned to be 
implemented to eliminate or minimize the risk of terrorist attack, to mitigate the 
consequences of any attack that does occur, or to respond to an attack that does occur.  
To the extent the plan identifies measures that have not yet been implemented, the plan 
shall either present the schedule for implementation of the identified measures or 
document that the costs of the measures are not justified by the anticipated security and 
public safety benefits. 
The last and most controversial aspect of the Standards is a requirement to 
conduct a review of the practicability and the potential for adopting inherently safer 
technology (IST) as part of the SVA for the 45 facilities in the sector that handle 
extraordinarily hazardous substances (EHS).  IST is defined as the principles or 
techniques incorporated in a covered process to minimize or eliminate the potential for an 
EHS accident that include, but are not limited to, the following: 1) reducing the amount 
of EHS material that may be released; 2) substituting less hazardous materials; 3) using 
EHSs in the least hazardous process conditions or form; 4) designing equipment and 
processes to minimize the potential for equipment failure and human error.  This review 
must also include an analysis of whether the adoption of IST alternatives is practicable 
and the basis for any determination that implementation of IST is impractical. 
 
3The Standards mandate that the SVA and plans mentioned above be completed 
and made available to the NJDEP by March 21, 2006.  Due to valid industry concerns of 
safeguarding the information, all assessments, plans, reports and reviews required by 
these Standards must be maintained on site for inspection by representatives of NJDEP or 
the Task Force during normal business hours. This information will provide an industry 
baseline and a framework in which to direct future policy in this area.   Several states 
have established homeland security statutes and, in addition to New Jersey, both 
Maryland and New York have state laws or regulations specifically addressing chemical 
facility security. 
The NJDEP planned to tier the results by compliance level to prioritize for future 
action.  The top tier would include facilities that are determined to have ignored the 
Standards/SBPs or have obvious and easily exploited vulnerabilities.  A middle tier 
would address facilities that have demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with the 
SBPs but have not achieved full compliance.  The lowest tier would include facilities that 
are determined to be in full compliance with the SBPs and warrant no further action at 
this time. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research topic will deal with the steps necessary to adequately secure the 
chemical industry from acts of terrorism.  The research question is two fold.  The first 
part focuses on whether the existing federal government policy, which is based upon 
voluntary actions by industry, is truly fulfilling its intended role of safeguarding the 
public from terrorist attacks on a chemical facility.  If existing efforts are found to be 
insufficient, the second part of the question considers a mandatory approach, through 
rigid regulation of this sector, to balance the potential loss of life with the economic 
impact on industry. 
 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The significance of this research is demonstrated by an Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) analysis of risk management plans submitted by facilities handling 
4chemicals covered by the Clean Air Act Section 112.  This analysis revealed that at least 
123 plants reported a worst-case scenario encompassing a vulnerability zone with more 
than one million people.1  Too many lives are at stake to assume that the current 
voluntary approach is effectively safeguarding the public. A critical evaluation of each 
facility’s security vulnerability assessment and their response to the recommendations of 
that analysis is required to determine the direction of future government policy.  This 
thesis provides federal and state governments with the information necessary to 
implement an effective and practical solution to this problem. 
 
D. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
1. Existing Policy/Differing Views 
The existing federal policy toward securing chemical facilities from terrorist 
attack relies upon voluntary actions by industry.  This policy, in place prior to September 
11, has not motivated the chemical industry to adequately enhance their security  
safeguards.2  This opinion, however,  is widely disputed by the American Chemistry 
Council (ACC), which adopted a Responsible Care® Security Code in June 2002.    The 
implementation of the Security Code is mandatory for all ACC members and partner 
companies such as the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association.  The 
ACC maintains that their members are in full compliance with the Security Code.  
However, the ACC recognizes that not all chemical facilities belong to the ACC, and may 
not have taken the same aggressive steps that member companies have taken to secure 
their sites.3   The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officially recognizes the 
Security Code as an Alternative Security Program for the purposes of compliance with 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 
The central question in the literature is whether the existing voluntary approach to 
chemical industry security is safeguarding America.  Frank J. Cilluffo of George 
Washington University offered in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives 
                                                 
1 Linda-Jo Schierow, Chemical Plant Security (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
2005), 9. 
2 Ibid., 14. 
3 Martin J. Durbin, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure 
Protection, and Cybersecurity of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Congress No. 109, Session 
No. 1, June 15, 2005. 
5that regulations can create a “check in the box” mentality, where industry does just 
enough to meet the requirements and are further disinclined from making proactive 
homeland security investments.4  If regulations are determined to be appropriate, the 
classification of those facilities subject to the requirements is critical to their success.  
Securing the United States against every conceivable vulnerability that terrorists could 
exploit in the chemical infrastructure would be both impossible and counterproductive.5 
An important question is which agency is most appropriate to assume the 
responsibility of regulating chemical industry security.  The EPA administers two federal 
laws that reduce risks at chemical facilities.  The Emergency Response and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and the Clean Air Act (CAA).  These programs both focus 
on the accidental releases of hazardous chemicals.  It is important to note that these 
programs were intended to address accidental releases only and did not specifically take 
into account terrorist attacks.  Though the EPA originally had  responsibility for chemical 
security, that authority has since been transferred to the DHS.  The determination of 
responsibility is further complicated by the fact that the EPA, from an environmental 
standpoint, is much more familiar with the chemical industry.  Furthermore, DHS lacked 
authority to require industry action until the 109th Congress enacted chemical security 
legislation as Section 550 of the DHS appropriations legislation, P.L. 109-125. 
One possible option is to regulate the chemical industry through the general duty 
clause of the CAA.  The EPA general duty clause directs industry to design and maintain 
a safe facility in order to prevent dangerous releases.  Codifying security language into 
the CAA could provide the EPA with explicit authority to oversee chemical facility 
security.  However, Richard Falkenrath of the Brookings Institution, in testimony before 
the U.S. Senate, pointed out that the legal merits of this claim are suspect as a practical 
political matter, and that any new regulatory initiative with enormous economic 
implications requires unambiguous statutory authorization.6    
                                                 
4 Frank J. Cilluffo, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure 
Protection, and Cybersecurity, House Committee on Homeland Security, Congress No. 109, Session No. 1, 
June 15, 2005. 
5James Jay Carafano, Principles for Congressional Action on Chemical Security (Washington, 
D.C.:Heritage Foundation, March 31, 2006), available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/em997.cfm (Accessed November 8, 2006).  
6 Richard A. Falkenrath, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, Congress No. 109, Session No. 1, April 27, 2005. 
6Another option for achieving greater security is to create incentives for voluntary 
compliance.  Suggested incentives include federal grants, tax breaks, and other assistance  
from the EPA and DHS.  In March 2003, and updated in March 2005, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the overall protection of chemical infrastructure 
and, in particular, the existing incentives available to the chemical industry for voluntary 
compliance. The GAO recognized that progress has been made in securing the industry 
but also recommended a legislative proposal to require chemical facilities to 
expeditiously assess their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and, where necessary, require 
these facilities to take corrective action.7  As such, the GAO recommendation combines 
both voluntary and regulatory approaches.  If a facility’s vulnerability assessment 
demonstrates that all necessary safeguards are in place, that facility would have achieved 
compliance through the existing voluntary approach.  GAO only recommends a 
mandatory approach be implemented for those facilities that have failed to adequately 
safeguard their sites, proven through a vulnerability assessment. 
The regulatory approach is supported by those who believe that for-profit entities 
are incapable of self regulation.  A counter argument is that money spent on security 
improvements are offset by reductions in theft and insurance premiums, and an increase 
in public confidence.  Sal DePasquale, an independent consultant, in testimony before the 
U.S. House of Representatives, stated that without prescriptive standards there can be no 
self regulation.  The result of guidelines and nice sounding best practices is to create a 
smoke and mirrors exercise that makes it appear that something serious is being 
accomplished, when it is not.8  A secondary concern voiced by sectors outside of the 
chemical and petroleum industries is that a regulatory approach could set a precedent for  
government oversight that could spread to all types of industry. 
A final related issue concerns the confidentiality and protection of information 
collected under a regulatory or pseudo regulatory approach. Chemical facilities that have 
performed vulnerability assessments and have, or are in, the process of correcting 
deficiencies are not inclined to share this information outside of their company.  A 
                                                 
7 Government Accountability Office, Protection of Chemical and Water Infrastructure (Washington, 
D.C.: GAO, 2005), available at: http://www.gao.gov/htect/d05327.html (Accessed October 17, 2005). 
8 Sal DePasquale, Testimony Before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity, Congress No. 109, Session No. 1, June 
15, 2005. 
7regulatory approach would most likely require the submission of the vulnerability 
assessments, the decisions made to address the deficiencies, and the implementation 
schedule of the necessary improvements to DHS, EPA, and possibly the law enforcement 
community.  The question of the government’s ability to protect and/or exclude this 
information from freedom of information requests must be thoroughly addressed in the 
development of any new law and associated regulation.  Though law enforcement has a 
history of protecting sensitive information, other government agencies, may find it 
difficult to do so. The industry perspective on releasing security information centers on 
the potential risk to the company’s reputation among stockholders, customers, and the 
general public.  Bobby Gilham, manager of global security at ConocoPhillips, in an 
article appearing in CSO Magazine, is concerned that any vulnerability information  
could be viewed as a road map for terrorists.9  
Since September 11 the voluntary approach has resulted in an improved working 
relationship between industry and all levels of government.  The cooperative atmosphere 
provides for more two way information sharing and allows the public sector easier access 
to private sector resources to fight the war on terrorism.  Close relationships and effective 
communication between industry and government agencies is an essential element for 
success in both the prevention and response arenas.  Stephen P. Bandy, Manager of 
Corporate Safety and Security for Marathon Ashland Petroleum fears that this level of 
information sharing will diminish if an agency is turned into an industry regulator 
through enactment of federal security legislation.10 However, Mr. Bandy appears to 
contradict himself as some of the agencies he mentioned industry is working well with 
such as the Department of Transportation, Department of Energy, and the U.S. Coast 
Guard already have regulatory jurisdiction in certain aspects over the chemical and 
petroleum industry. 
2. Analogous Problems/Methods Applied 
There are two similar federal and state regulations that govern the chemical 
industry: the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and New Jersey’s 
                                                 
9 Todd Datz, “Capital Ideas,” CSO Magazine (December 1, 2003), available at: 
http://www.csoonline.com/read/120103/ideas.html (Accessed October 17, 2005). 
10 Stephen P. Bandy, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure 
Protection and Cybersecurity of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Congress No. 109, Session 
No. 1, June 15, 2005. 
8Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (NJTCPA).  These mandatory regulations provide 
lessons learned for this research. The NJTCPA requires chemical facilities to submit risk 
management plans as a means of reducing the risk of a catastrophic release of an 
extraordinarily hazardous substance.  The NJTCPA incorporates by reference the 
requirements of Section 112 of the CAA but is broader in scope and more prescriptive 
than the federal requirements.  This program has been successful to the point that the 
NJTCPA is considered a model throughout the country.  Since inception of the program 
the number of facilities handling extraordinarily hazardous substances has decreased by 
eighty percent.  Inherently Safer Technology evaluation, mentioned later in this proposal, 
may have a similar effect in terms of reducing the number of facilities of concern. The 
OSHA standards for worker safety are also considered to be a success but the oversight 
and enforcement piece of the law has been subject to criticism.  Specifically, due to 
limited resources, OSHA is not generally considered a proactive program but more often 
a reactive program only making a presence at a facility after an accident has occurred.  
The NJTCPA and the OSHA laws are typical command and control government 
regulations.  The key lesson to be drawn from this is that the success of government 
regulation depends upon an effective oversight and enforcement program.  As mentioned 
previously, companies may be unlikely to comply fully with security regulations without 
strict government oversight. 
Due to limited resources, Federal and state regulatory agencies have been 
exploring other avenues to implement regulatory obligations.  Third-party inspections 
coupled with insurance can encourage facilities throughout the supply chain to focus on 
risk management.  The rationale for this is based upon the vast number of firms in the 
chemical sector.  The number of audits by regulatory agencies can therefore be reduced 
through coordination with the private sector.   
The 107th Congress enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 
(MTSA)(P.L. 107-295), which assigned the Coast Guard the responsibility of securing 
our Nation’s ports and those facilities located within our ports.  Under MTSA, the Coast 
Guard has the authority to shut down a facility if it is out of compliance with the security 
program. There are 238 chemical facilities subject to the MTSA vulnerability assessment 
9and security plan requirements.11  The State of New Jersey has a total of nine chemical 
and 34 petroleum facilities subject to the MTSA. The New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (NJDEP) has worked closely with the New York and 
Philadelphia Coast Guard sectors, including joint inspections.  This collaboration has 
resulted in sharing various Coast Guard checklists with the NJDEP, joint inspections, 
communication of general compliance rates, and specific security concerns that may 
require particular attention.  The coupling of safety and security was supported by the 
Coast Guard, which testified that security auditing under MTSA often occurred while the 
Coast Guard was present at a chemical facility for safety reasons.12 
Former Senator Jon Corzine, now the Governor of New Jersey, proposed strict 
federal security regulations for the chemical industry.  However, his proposal failed after 
spirited Senate deliberations.  Currently two chemical sector security initiatives are under 
consideration at the federal level: (1) the 109th Congress enacted chemical security 
legislation as Section 550 of the DHS appropriations legislation, P.L. 109-125, and (2) 
the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 (H.R. 5695). 
P.L. 109-125 requires the DHS, no later than six months after the enactment date 
of October 4, 2006, to issue interim final regulations establishing risk-based performance 
standards for security of chemical facilities and requiring vulnerability assessments and 
the development and implementation of site security plans for chemical facilities.  It is 
unclear at this point the number of facilities that will be subject to these requirements as 
the Secretary of DHS has the discretion to limit the scope to only those that present high 
levels of security risk.   However, it is known that facilities regulated by the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002, Public Water Systems, Treatment Works, 
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy facilities, or any facility subject to 
regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are exempt from these regulations.  
The law authorizes DHS to inspect facilities and close down those that are determined to 
be noncompliant.  However only civil penalties are authorized for noncompliance, 
criminal penalties are not an option.  The law is silent on numerous issues, including the 
                                                 
11 John B. Stephenson, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Congress No. 109, Session No. 1, April 27, 2005. 
12 Craig E. Bone, Testimony Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee, Congress No. 109, Session No. 1, July 27, 2005. 
10
criteria for weighting risks of various facilities, federal preemption of state and local 
right-to-know laws, how to facilitate congressional oversight, and the role of inherently 
safer technology.13 
On December 22, 2006, DHS issued an advance notice of rulemaking to seek 
comment on both the proposed text for interim final regulations and on several practical 
and policy issues integral to the development of a chemical facility security program.  
Written comments on the proposal were due to DHS on or before February 7, 2007.  
Although many companies in the chemical industry have initiated voluntary security 
programs and have made significant capital investments in responsible security measures, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security has concluded that voluntary efforts alone will not 
provide sufficient security for the nation.14 
The program proposed by DHS would be implemented in phases and contain the 
following basic steps: 
• Chemical facilities fitting certain risk profiles would complete a “Top-
screen” risk assessment methodology accessible through a secure 
Department website.  The Department would use this methodology to 
determine if a chemical facility “presents a high level of security risk” and 
should be covered by the program. 
• If the Department determines that a chemical facility qualifies as “high 
risk,” the Department would require the facility to prepare and submit a 
Vulnerability Assessment and Site Security Plan, and would provide 
technical assistance to the facility as appropriate. 
• Following a facility’s submission of these materials, the Department 
would review the submissions for compliance with risk-based 
performance standards.  The Department (or when appropriate, a DHS-
certified third-party auditor) would follow up with a site inspection and 
audit. 
• If the facility’s Vulnerability Assessment or Site Security Plan is found 
deficient or if other problems arise, the facility could seek further technical 
                                                 
13 Schierow, Chemical Plant Security, 47. 
11
assistance from the Department, and could consult, object, or appeal 
depending on the stage of the process.  If the Vulnerability Assessment 
and/or Site Security Plan are ultimately disapproved, the covered facility 
would be required to revise its plan and resubmit the materials to meet the 
Department’s performance standards, or face the penalties and other 
remedies set forth in the statute. 
• If the covered facility’s submissions are approved, the security plan is 
fully implemented and the facility is otherwise in compliance, the 
Department would issue a Letter of Approval to document the 
determination.  The Department would also then notify the facility of its 
continuing obligations – based on its level of risk – to maintain and 
periodically update its Vulnerability Assessment and Site Security Plan.15 
DHS is currently considering a number of procedural questions that relate to P.L. 
109-125 and specifically solicits comments on alternative approaches throughout this 
document.  These questions will be mentioned in the order they appear in the proposal 
and where appropriate, background information to provide appropriate context will be 
provided. 
A fundamental question posed by Section 550 is which facilities it covers.  
Section 550 specifies that the provision shall apply to chemical facilities that, at the 
discretion of the Secretary, present high levels of security risk.16  The Department 
proposes to define a chemical facility as any facility that possesses or plans to possess a 
quantity of a chemical substance determined by the Secretary to be potentially dangerous 
or that meets other risk-related criterion.17  However, the DHS continues to solicit input 
on any alternative definitions of the term chemical facility.   
The appropriate process to determine which facilities present sufficient risk is also 
in question.  Existing chemical lists such as the EPA RMP substances, the schedule of 
                                                 
14 Department of Homeland Security, DHS-2006-0073, RIN 1601-AA41, 6 CFR Part 27, Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (Washington, D.C.: DHS,  December 22, 2006), 2.  
15 Department of Homeland Security, DHS-2006-0073, RIN 1601-AA41, 6 CFR Part 27, Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 4. 
16 Ibid., 21. 
17 Department of Homeland Security, DHS-2006-0073, RIN 1601-AA41, 6 CFR Part 27, Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 22. 
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chemicals from the Convention on the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, the hazardous materials listed in the 
Department of Transportation’s Hazardous Materials Regulations, and the TSA Select 
Hazardous Materials List are all given as potential sources of information.  The DHS 
requests comments on appropriate information for evaluating chemical facility risks and 
also whether classification should be based on a hazard class approach rather than based 
on particular chemicals.18 The DHS proposes a methodology system very similar to the 
RAMCAP “Top-screen” process to determine the high-risk facilities.  The proposal 
requests comments as to whether the DHS should request that: 
• RMP facilities complete the Top-screen; 
• Certain facilities subject to the Chemical Weapons Convention complete 
the Top-screen; 
• Any other type or description of facilities complete the Top-screen.19 
To address human health and safety consequences, economic impacts, and mission 
impacts the RAMCAP “Top-screen” tool would ask the facility the following types of 
questions: 
 
• Whether a toxic release worst-case scenario (as identified by the facility 
under the EPA Risk Management Program) might expose a residential 
population greater than or equal to 200,000 persons, and if so, whether the 
distance in such a scenario might exceed 25 miles; 
• Whether a flammable release worst-case scenario (as identified by the 
facility under the EPA Risk Management Program) might expose a 
residential population greater than or equal to 1,000 persons; 
• Whether the facility manufactures or stores explosive materials in 
sufficient quantities to result in an offsite residential exposed population; 
• Whether the facility has any specified chemical weapon or chemical 
weapon precursors; 
                                                 
18 Department of Homeland Security, DHS-2006-0073, RIN 1601-AA41, 6 CFR Part 27, Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 24. 
19 Ibid., 27. 
13
• Whether the facility produces products of national economic importance 
or whose loss could negatively impact multiple economic sectors; 
• Whether an attack on the facility could cause collateral physical damage to 
key transportation assets; 
• Whether the facility has chemicals for which it provides 35 percent of the 
U.S. domestic production capacity; 
• Whether the facility is the sole U.S. supplier; 
• Whether the facility produces a chemical or product used in the 
manufacture of defense weapons; 
• Whether the facility produces a chemical or product supplied to and for 
use by multiple defense weapons systems contractors; 
• Whether the facility is a major chemical supplier (>35 percent market 
share) to the Department of Defense for reasons other than defense 
weapons systems; 
• Whether a facility produces a chemical or product directly to another 
manufacturer, producer, or distributor for subsequent use in the 
manufacture of defense weapons systems; 
• Whether a facility serves as a major or sole supplier to a public health, 
water treatment, or power generation facility.20 
The DHS believes that the risk based performance standards mandated by Section 550 
should incorporate risk-based tiering.  The five following questions are posed to 
determine the best approach to develop such a system. 
• How many risk-based tiers should the Department create? 
• What should be the criteria for differentiating among the tiers? 
• What types of risk should be most critical in the tiering? 
• How should the performance standards differ among risk-based tiers? 
• What additional levels of regulatory scrutiny (e.g. frequency of 
inspections, plan reviews, and updates) should apply to each tier?21 
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In terms of vulnerability assessments, the DHS is considering accepting any 
methodologies that are certified by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) as 
equivalent methodology and will review other methodologies through the Alternative 
Security Program (ASP) provisions.22 ASP is defined as a third-party or industry 
organization program, a state or Federal government program or any aspect thereof that 
provides an equivalent level of security to that established by the DHS. 
Several components related to background checks are being considered, including 
the following: 
• The individuals for whom background checks would be conducted 
(whether that would include employees with access to restricted areas of 
the facility, all employees, unescorted visitors, all individuals with access 
to the facility or any combination of the above); 
• The timing of this requirement particularly as it applies to employees (i.e., 
whether a background check should be conducted in association with the 
hiring process and, if so, how to address this requirement for current 
employees); 
• The type of background check that should be conducted and therefore the 
type of personally identifiable information that would be required of these 
individuals, such as biometrics.  Background checks might include a 
terrorism name check against the consolidated Terrorist Screening 
Database, a fingerprint-based check against terrorism and/or criminal 
history records, or a broader law enforcement or immigration status check; 
• Whether the government should conduct these checks or whether the 
industry could use authorized third parties to conduct these checks.23 
Regardless of the resolution of the background check issues, the cost and the 
company/individual/agency responsible to pay for this initiative is a significant concern. 
 Vulnerability assessments and site security plans are proposed to be updated on a 
regular cycle or as needed basis.  The renewal timeframes are based upon the tier 
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designation of the facility with the highest tier required to complete the updates each 
year.  Specific information relating to a particular facility may result in more or less 
frequent update and renewal cycles as appropriate. 
 The regulations issued under Section 550 will not apply to public water systems 
(as defined by section 1401 of the Safe Drinking Water Act); water treatment works 
facilities (as defined by section 212 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act); any 
facilities owned or operated by the Departments of Defense and Energy; and any 
facilities subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.24  The regulations 
will also not apply to facilities covered under the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
(MTSA) of 2002 but there are concerns of how to address facilities subject to MTSA but 
not the part 105 security standards.  An additional concern is the potential for the 
regulations to impede the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives’’ 
current authorities which include the purchase, possession, storage, and transportation of 
explosives. 
 The DHS intends to set forth a methodology for analyzing the costs of the interim 
rule.  As a result input is requested on how to group facilities that will need to comply 
into “model facilities” for cost estimating purposes.  The criteria under consideration to 
develop facility subgroups include: 
• Should the “model facility” criteria incorporate risk-based tiering?  
Compliance costs may differ for a facility according to a risk-based tier. 
• Should the “model facility” criteria consider the size of the facility?  
Larger facilities may face higher compliance costs than smaller facilities 
as larger facilities may need to construct longer fences or hire more 
guards.  For the purpose of facilitating comment, facilities with six or 
more processes or chemicals being stored or used would be considered to 
be “larger.” 
• Should facilities that are enclosed (i.e., warehouse, enclosed 
manufacturing sites) be treated as a “model facility” for cost estimating 
purposes? 
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• Should facilities that might be targeted by criminals for chemical theft or 
diversion be treated as a “model facility” for cost estimating purposes? 
• The “model facility” estimates are expected to include current market 
prices of possible security enhancements that facilities may choose to 
undertake.  Possible enhancements include, but are not limited to: Primary 
and secondary fences, barriers at the gate, perimeter vehicle barrier, 
perimeter lighting, inside lighting, CCTV system, guards, guard houses, 
fence line intrusion detection system, handheld radios, staging area for 
vehicle screenings and enhanced communication systems.25 
The DHS is particularly concerned that a conflict or potential conflict between an 
approved Site Security Plan and state regulatory efforts could create ambiguity that 
would delay or compromise implementation of security measures at a facility.  To avoid 
any such delays, there may be an immediate need to address potential preemption and 
clarify application of the law.26  As a result, the proposal permits State or local 
governments, and/or covered facilities, to seek opinions on preemption from the DHS. 
H.R. 5695 based on the September 29, 2006 amended version does address many 
of the issues not included in P.L. 109-125.  The criteria to designate chemical facilities 
subject to H.R. 5695 include the following: 
• The potential threat or likelihood that the chemical facility will be the 
target of terrorism. 
• The potential extent and likelihood of death, injury or serious adverse 
effects to human health and safety or to the environment that could result 
from a chemical facility terrorist incident. 
• The proximity of the chemical facility to population centers. 
• The potential threat caused by a person obtaining a substance of concern 
in furtherance of an act of terrorism. 
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• The potential harm to critical infrastructure, national security, and the 
national economy from a chemical facility terrorist incident.27 
Based upon this criteria DHS would be required to develop regulations identifying 
facilities of concern, determine the risk to the nation’s security associated with those 
facilities, set security performance standards, and establish requirements for vulnerability 
assessments and security plans. 
In regards to federal preemption, H.R. 5695 does not preclude or deny the right of 
any State to adopt any chemical facility security regulation that is more stringent unless 
the requirement would frustrate the purposes of this title.  In addition, a person, State, or 
local government may submit a request to the Secretary of DHS to determine whether a 
specific requirement is preempted by this title.  It is unclear from the proposal, other than 
a mandated 180 timeframe for the Secretary to render a decision, the criteria that DHS 
would use to make a preemption determination.  However, preemption is clearer in terms 
of IST regulation.  The Committee does not believe that a State law would frustrate the 
purposes of this title if such State law requires a chemical facility to use or consider using 
a modification, process, substitution, or reduction of a substance of concern for the 
purposes of reducing the consequences of a terrorist incident.28  Any decision to preempt 
existing state programs would likely lead to criticism that H.R. 5695 actually reduced, 
instead of enhanced, chemical facility security in that particular jurisdiction. 
Congressional oversight is addressed through reports to Congress from the 
Secretary of DHS and the DHS Inspector General.  No later than one year after the date 
of enactment, the Secretary must submit a report to Congress updating the national 
strategy for the chemical sector.29  The national strategy requires an analysis of the 
resources necessary to implement and enforce mandatory security requirements.  The 
Committee seeks to have this report updated and resubmitted but it is possible that the 
Sector Specific Plan for the Chemical Sector may satisfy this requirement.  The DHS 
Inspector General is required, one year after the date of enactment, to submit a report to 
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Part 1 – To Accompany H.R. 5695 (Washington, D.C.:  September 29, 2006), 52.  
28 Ibid., 44. 
29 Ibid., 47. 
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Congress on the effectiveness of implementation, and an assessment of the facility 
security plans required, along with any future recommendations. 
IST is required to be evaluated as part of an assessment of methods to reduce the 
consequences of a terrorist attack.  The facility may be required to implement alternative 
methods if and only if the Secretary determines that the methods would: significantly 
reduce the risk of death or injury from a terrorist release; the methods can be feasibly 
incorporated in the operation of the facility; and the methods would not impair the ability 
of the owner or operator to continue in business.30  In the case of a determination to 
implement alternatives, an option to appeal the decision to the Panel on Methods to 
Reduce the Consequences of a Terrorist Attack is included.  This panel is chaired by the 
Secretary and includes representatives of other Federal agencies, security experts, and the 
chemical industry.  The Secretary must take into consideration not only the reduction in 
risk to a specific facility, but also the overall risk to the chemical manufacturing and 
production system including the possibility of the risk being shifted to other locations.  In 
terms of feasibility and continuity of operations, consideration is given to potential loss of 
work time, productivity changes, and the cost and scale of proposed changes.  The 
Committee does not intend to require facilities to adopt new, unproven, or non-existent 
technologies, processes, or procedures.31  Exemptions to this section include facilities 
owned or operated by the Departments of Defense, Justice, or Energy or any facility that 
is owned or operated by a licensee or certificate holder of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. 
An appropriate definition of what is considered a chemical facility is critical to 
the success of any type of regulatory approach.  There are three mechanisms that have 
commonly been proposed to select facilities that should be subject to regulation.  These 
approaches include defining the sector by the hazardous substances on site, the adverse 
consequences that may result if attacked, and by industry classification.  Defining the 
sector by companies that have a threshold quantity of listed hazardous substances is 
possibly the most straight forward since the Emergency Planning and Community Right 
to Know Act (EPCRA) and the Clean Air Act (CAA) both contain established lists.  The 
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challenge is to determine which of these listed substances should be included when 
considering homeland security.  The CAA and in New Jersey’s case, NJTCPA, have been 
recognized as a logical starting point since the chemicals are included on these lists based 
upon their potential for off site consequences to human health or the environment in the 
event of an accidental release.  However, these lists exclude potentially hazardous 
substances such as explosives and exempt other materials such as liquefied natural gas.  
Consideration would have to be given whether it is appropriate to include substances 
either omitted or exempted for the purposes of homeland security.  It may not be 
adequate to simply adopt an existing list from another agency with the expectation that 
these are the only substances of concern.32 
A Congressional Research Service analysis of the EPA risk management program 
database demonstrated that chemical manufacturing constitutes only a portion of that  
universe.  The water and food/agriculture sectors had a similar number of facilities 
storing extraordinarily hazardous materials.  Therefore, chemical security legislation that 
incorporates all EPA facilities will affect many sites not generally considered to be 
chemical facilities.  A possible solution could be to set a threshold that would only 
include high risk facilities.  An appropriate threshold would only capture high risk 
facilities and it would be expected that the majority of those facilities would be chemical 
manufacturers.  There still would be representation from other sectors which would 
require the chemical facility security regulations to be flexible enough to account for 
different operating environments and business practices.  A food sector facility subject to 
the requirements due to large amounts of ammonia on site for refrigeration purposes 
would have substantially different needs and procedures in place than a chemical 
manufacturer whose prime business line is the production of phosgene. 
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The likelihood and severity of the adverse consequences in the case of a terrorist 
attack is another potential criterion to define the chemical sector universe.  DHS has 
taken a risk based prioritization approach for protecting critical infrastructure.  A 
threshold consequence would assist in the determination of which facilities should 
receive additional resources or require additional attention.  The type of data to be used 
for determining a consequence threshold is an issue as DHS uses a different methodology 
to determine the affected population resulting from a terrorist attack than what EPA uses 
for the risk of an accidental release.  The EPA model is well established and some assert 
that these figures are a viable starting point for prioritizing chemical security risk.33  
However, other analysts assert that EPA figures overestimate the actual number of 
casualties and in one in example DHS modeling of a specific facility showed the number 
of persons potentially affected was much lower than projected from regulatory 
calculations.34  It is also important to understand that the EPA worst case scenario is 
based upon an accidental release from the largest vessel at the site.  Therefore, the EPA 
scenario would most likely underestimate the impacts of an intentional attack that targets 
multiple storage areas at a given location. 
Industry classification is another option to determine the sector universe.  The 
Department of Labor uses the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) 
to classify employment and economic data by industry.  These codes are many times self-
assigned by the facility as they select a code that most appropriately defines their 
business activity.  The New Jersey Standards used industry classification as part of the 
basis to capture the facilities subject to additional security requirements.  The lesson 
learned from the New Jersey example was that this approach captured facilities that had 
not been previously considered as part of the chemical sector and also omitted facilities 
from the mandatory requirements that were considered to be high risk sites.  
3. Strengths and Weaknesses 
There is a good deal of research or as some camps describe, opinions, of the 
appropriate solution to chemical industry security.  The weaknesses and gaps of the 
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existing approach centers on the lack of information available to demonstrate industry 
compliance with voluntary standards.  The Standards compliance inspection summary 
described later in this thesis identifies an industry baseline to estimate the number of 
facilities that have not made adequate efforts to safeguard their assets.  This research will 
provide an overall assessment of existing industry compliance and foster the development 
of recommendations to address security deficiencies found to exist in the chemical 
industry. 
 
E. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
The adequacy and effectiveness of the existing United States policy towards 
critical infrastructure protection (CIP) has been the subject of vigorous debates through 
all levels of government, the private sector responsible for the majority of these sites, 
public advocacy groups, and concerned citizens.  The CIP framework has been the focal 
point of this debate with a growing concern that interdependencies have not been 
adequately addressed.  Regardless of the framework, protection of information is vital to 
any chosen policy direction. As a result, these three areas have been chosen for this 
analysis.  There are many other CIP issues of interest but these three in particular are the 
most critical to be addressed for overall strategy decisions. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security generally relies on a cooperative 
approach between government agencies and the private sector to determine and address 
vulnerabilities.  Adequate metrics do not exist in most CIP sectors to gauge the success of 
this cooperative approach, leading to calls for strict government regulatory oversight to 
ensure compliance.  Furthermore, interdependencies between sectors have only begun to 
be addressed. Protection of critical or sensitive information also varies among sectors and 
must be consistently applied to safeguard CIP assets.  Overall, the serious consequences 
of a successful attack on critical infrastructure requires an in-depth evaluation of current 
practices. 
This chapter focuses on these specific areas of CIP and overviews the strategic 
approaches taken by the European Union, Australia, and Canada.  These strategies are 
then compared to the existing CIP approach in the United States with the goal of 
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developing policy recommendations to protect the American chemical industry from 
terrorist attacks. It is important to note that CIP is a very dynamic policy field and many 
countries are still struggling, just as we are, to determine the most effective approach.  
Myriam Dunn of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Center for Security Studies 
suggests that the differences in the state and the quality of the protection practices in the 
14 countries she surveyed are in fact so substantial that we must reasonably ask ourselves 
whether we run the risk of comparing apples and oranges when trying to learn something 
new from them.35  The main difficulty with the comparison of CIP policies is that 
countries and their various key players shape the issue in accordance with their politico-
centric view of the problem.  In most cases, agreement on the nature of the problem and 
what specifically needs to be protected is, in itself, a major challenge. 
The existing CIP framework in the United States is generally a voluntary 
approach focused on cooperative partnerships between government and the private 
sector.  However, there are prescriptive requirements in place for a few sectors such as 
the nuclear and water industry. There are ongoing discussions through various 
Congressional proposals that would mandate security requirements in additional areas 
such as the petroleum, rail transportation, pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. 
2. European Union 
The Commission of the European Communities published a document in 
November 2005, entitled “Green Paper on a European Program for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection.”  The objective of the green paper was to solicit input from interested 
stakeholders concerning possible policy options for the European Program for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP).  As would be expected from a topic as broad as critical 
infrastructure protection, this document covers a diverse range of policy issues.  This 
analysis focuses on the framework, confidentiality, and interdependency issues 
previously mentioned and detail the applied methodologies. 
The EPCIP framework is still under discussion with three basic options, 
voluntary, mandatory, or a mixture depending on the sector/issue in question.  However, 
only a legal framework would provide a strong and enforceable legal basis for a coherent 
and uniform implementation of measures to protect European Critical Infrastructure, as 
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well as defining clearly the respective responsibilities of Member States and the 
Commission.36  The concern is also raised that although voluntary measures provide 
flexibility there may not be sufficient clarity to adequately define roles and 
responsibilities.  Proportionality of cost is a key consideration as it is crucial to maintain 
stability of the sectors and not negatively effect a sector’s competitive position in the 
world market.  Measures will only be proposed where a need has been identified 
following an analysis of existing security gaps and will be proportionate to the level of  
risk and the type of threat involved.37 
A recent follow up proposal from the Commission directed the severity of the 
consequences of the disruption or destruction of a particular infrastructure to be assessed 
on the basis, where possible, of: 
• Public effect (number of population affected); 
• Economic effect (significance of economic loss and/or degradation of 
products or services); 
• Environmental effect; 
• Political effects; 
• Psychological effects; 
• Public health consequences.38 
Article 5 of the proposal requires all critical infrastructure owners/operators to prepare 
operator security plans (OSPs).  At a minimum the OSPs must include: 
• identification of important assets; 
• a risk analysis based on major threat scenarios, vulnerability of each asset, 
and potential impact shall be conducted; 
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• identification, selection and prioritization of counter measures and 
procedures with a distinction between permanent security measures and 
graduated security measures.39 
Graduated security measures are those that are activated according to varying risk and 
threat levels. 
The Netherlands undertook a unique approach to eliminate the transportation of 
chlorine by rail.  The national rail system previously transported 50,000 to 60,000 tons of 
chlorine annually and was the target of protests for years due to the risk they pose, 
particularly for the villages and cities the trains passed through at night.40   The 
government entered into an agreement with Akzo Nobel, the largest producer in the 
country, to dismantle one factory and concentrate activities at two strategically located 
sites where new factories were to be built.  The new construction included a 65 million 
euro contribution from the government.41  As a result, hazardous transports of chlorine, 
except for occasional small shipments, are no longer necessary in the Netherlands. 
The European Commission views information sharing as critical but counters that 
the sharing of certain specific facts about the CI asset could be used to cause 
unacceptable consequences.  Both at the European Union level and Member States level 
CIP information would be classified and access granted only on a need-to-know basis.42  
Any personnel handling classified information will have an appropriate level of security 
vetting by the Member State of which the person concerned is a national.43 Designation 
of a senior representative to act as a Security Liaison Officer (SLO) between the 
owner/operator of the CI and the appropriate government authority enhances the ability to 
protect sensitive information.  The SLO would be the main government contact to 
disseminate information and an active partner in developing security and contingency 
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plans.  This structure also provides a bottom up approach to regulating CI as significant 
responsibility is placed upon the private sector.  This is not to suggest that the 
Commission views the SLO as working independently from other private sector partners 
in the determination of criticality throughout a region.  There is an expectation that it is 
not necessary to provide equal levels of security to all assets but rather all SLOs work 
together with relevant authorities to safeguard the critical nodes of the CI network. 
Interdependencies within and between businesses, industry sectors, geographical 
jurisdictions and member states are given full consideration under the European 
Commission’s strategy.  Designation of CI is at the European level due to the cross 
border nature of the infrastructure.  Proposals for minimum protective measures, which 
may include mandatory standards based on the sector, are to be developed by the 
Commission working together with all the member states and private sector key 
stakeholders.  An arbitration mechanism and the responsibility for verification of the 
designation are two components that have yet to be fully developed. 
3. Australia 
The Australian framework of CIP is based upon a consistent, cooperative 
partnership between the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and governments. 
The Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
enables owners and operators of critical infrastructure to share information on important 
issues such as business continuity, consequence management, information system attacks 
and vulnerabilities, e-crime, protection of key sites from attack or sabotage, chemical, 
biological and radiological threats to water and food supplies, and the identification and 
protection of offshore and maritime assets.44 
In Australia the establishment of the TISN in April 2003 and the commitment 
from all parties to address CIP issues is credited, in a large part, to the private sector’s 
confidence in how sensitive information is shared and protected.  Initially, there were 
concerns about government freedom of information rules, the confidentiality of 
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information, and the potential misuse of commercial-in-confidence information.45  To 
address industry concerns, a Deed of Confidentiality was developed to protect sensitive 
information and ensure that information shared with TISN is not available for 
commercial or terrorist use.  The TISN fosters a culture of trust where key stakeholders 
come together in the spirit of protecting Australia’s CI.  The idea of using shared 
information for commercial gain or as an aid to furthering terrorism is no longer an issue 
for the TISN members. One of the TISN principles cautions that only credible threats 
should be disseminated to critical infrastructure partners so as to avoid undue concern in 
the Australian domestic community, as well as potential tourists and investors overseas. 
The Australian Critical Infrastructure Protection Modeling and Analysis (CIPMA) 
program maps the dependencies within and between CI sectors and facilities throughout 
Australia to better understand their relationship.  From a natural disaster in a regional 
area, to the loss of a gas compressor station or electrical substation, CIPMA will become 
an invaluable aid for decision makers in critical infrastructure protection, counter-
terrorism, and emergency management.46  There are three sectors currently involved with 
CIPMA, including: banking and finance, communication, and energy.  A fourth, 
undetermined sector, will be brought into the CIPMA program in the near future. 
4. Canada 
 Canada focuses its efforts both on improving ways to provide reasonable 
protection, and also on ways to assure the continued provision of essential services.  
Protection and assurance can be achieved through better information collection, 
assessment and sharing, and through risk management.  Both protection and assurance 
are ongoing objectives that Canada seeks to meet by building trusted partnerships. The 
framework of the CI strategy is based upon voluntary participation from industry 
stakeholders as well as from federal, provincial and territorial governments. However, 
Canada proposes to work with each sector in order to develop appropriate mechanisms 
for governance where required.  Suitable mechanisms may already exist within certain 
sectors, while others will have to be developed, taking into account existing legislative 
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and regulatory environments.  These governance mechanisms are to be designed with a 
primary goal of allowing government and the private sector to maximize coordination 
and integration of efforts.  
Canada realizes that the process of identifying specific infrastructure components 
as critical also creates its own set of challenges.  Since such information can be an 
attractive target to malicious actors, all information related to CI must be protected for 
reasons of national security and public safety, in addition to competitive and economic 
interests. Canada plans on using all of its available legislative and statutory instruments to 
appropriately protect CI information.  Confidentiality is especially important in this 
context as Canada’s goal is to share CI information across sectors.  CI owners and 
operators should possess information about the critical infrastructures of others on which 
they depend, and the threats to their own infrastructures to carry out their business 
continuity activities.47  Risk management practices can be significantly enhanced by the 
dissemination of information across traditional sector boundaries about potential threats 
and vulnerabilities that may impact previously considered unrelated CI. The Canadian 
Government’s position is that interdependency analysis must be integrated into risk 
management decisions, mitigation and preparation strategies, and response and recovery 
activities.  In addition, the Canadian Government will coordinate national efforts in 
interdependency research and development, which is essential to understanding this 
issue.48 
Canada’s Joint Infrastructure Interdependencies Research Program (JIIRP) is 
designed to help infrastructure owners and operators better understand the extent of their 
dependencies on other sectors for delivering their services and goods, and how the risks 
resulting from these interdependencies can be mitigated.49  The goal of the JIIRP is to 
bring together all organizations with a stake in safeguarding CI to develop partnerships 
and methods of information exchange.  Educational initiatives are also underway to 
promote understanding of CIP issues.  An example is the Public Safety and Emergency 
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Preparedness Canadian Emergency Management College (CEMC).  CEMC offers a CIP 
awareness course for both emergency management personnel and those responsible for 
the oversight of CI sectors.  This effort is currently focused on Federal government 
managers but the long term goal is to provide similar training to local government and 
private sector employees. The interdependencies issue has only recently been widely 
recognized and experts are still grappling with the severity of the problem and ways to 
solve it.50 
5. Conclusions 
The CIP framework in the United States is very similar to that of the government 
agencies surveyed. A cooperative partnership with all levels of government and the 
private sector is the keystone to achieving a successful CIP program.  However, the 
European Union and Canada include in their strategy, to varying degrees, the need, on a 
sector specific basis, to establish regulatory standards to implement and enforce 
minimum standards.  The lesson learned from the countries surveyed is to retain 
government regulation as a viable alternative to address CIP in industry sectors, or 
portions thereof, where market forces have proven ineffective in safeguarding CI assets.   
Protection of CI information is a good example of Myriam Dunn’s caution of 
comparing apples and oranges in CIP strategies. The European Union strategy of 
classifying CI information does not appear as a feasible option in the United States as it 
would conflict with many existing regulations focused on providing transparency in 
government operations.  However, a possible solution could rest with a simply stated but 
difficult to implement alternative: a critical analysis of CI information to evaluate 
whether the release of the data in question, from a security perspective, outweighs the 
public’s right to be fully aware of the threat and vulnerabilities in their area.   This 
analysis would have to be led by DHS with clear decision making matrices and a 
structure for consistent implementation through all levels of government and the private 
sector.  A clear and reasonable justification as to why a particular piece of CI information  
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is protected from public dissemination is the first step in assuring the public that the CIP 
information strategy is effective and truly focused on the data that can be used for 
malicious purposes. 
Australia’s CIPMA program, although only in effect for three sectors at this point, 
is a significant step forward in understanding the interdependencies that exist across CI 
sectors.  The existing close relationship between the United States and Australia is an 
excellent opportunity to leverage the CIPMA experiences to formulate an effective 
homeland strategy.  Further research is required to determine if Canada’s strategy to 
provide CI threats and vulnerabilities across sectors is appropriate for use in the United 
States.  Though, on the surface this may appear beneficial, it may result in information 
overload on the private sector until each facility is fully aware and has addressed their 
own weaknesses.  The reality is that the DHS does not have adequate interdependency 
methodology in place for CIP.   In general, the CI focus on vulnerability and risk 
management has been, at worst, facility specific and, at best, sector specific.  The next 
crucial step forward is the recognition of the vital nature of interdependencies across CI 
sectors and a framework to incorporate such into risk assessments.  The DHS Risk 
Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) program provides 
the potential to standardize risk assessments across CI sectors.  However, RAMCAP must 
also address interdependencies to provide an accurate picture of the challenges to 
protection, business continuity, and economic survival facing each CI facility. 
 
F. THREAT ASSESSMENT 
 The DHS lacks credible, specific, or corroborated intelligence indicating a direct 
threat to the U.S. chemical sector by terrorist groups.51  Recently, however, al-queda 
affiliated insurgent groups in Iraq have targeted chemical facilities to enhance the 
lethality of their attacks. As such, a plausible threat remains as a successful attack against 
chemical facilities has the potential to meet terrorist goals such as mass casualties, panic, 
and reduced confidence in the government’s ability to protect the population.  Economic 
effects are generally considered to be less substantial due to redundant capabilities and 
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product stockpiles, and the highly complex and distributed supply chain makes it very 
difficult to shut down the chemical industry by interruption at a single point.  However, 
any vulnerability analysis must take into account an attack at a dominant node or link of 
the supply chain of a critical chemical with the potential of bringing production to a 
standstill.  In order to achieve widespread interruption in production for an extended 
period, multiple interruptions at different locations would have to occur at dominant 
nodes or links.52  Even the worst accidents on record (Bhopal, Toulouse, Texas City) did 
not result in a situation in which the supply of the chemical or fertilizer in question could 
not be made available through other sources in a short time.53 This was evident during 
the aftermath of hurricanes Rita and Katrina which damaged more than 50 chemical 
plants and other infrastructure on which the chemical sector depends but did not cause 
catastrophic harm to the U.S. economy.54  In addition, the potential to steal or divert 
chemical sector assets for use in chemical and explosive based attacks is also a concern. 
 A direct attack on a chemical facility with the intent to release toxic chemicals is 
not unprecedented.55  However, the effectiveness of such an attack is limited by weather 
conditions, wind direction, existing mitigation capabilities, and specific knowledge of the 
facility in question.  As previously discussed the extensive availability of open source 
information pertaining to chemical facilities is a vulnerability that enhances a terrorist’s 
operational planning capability.  The facility itself is not the only area that must be 
protected as the chemical sector relies heavily on maritime, rail, and road transportation 
for raw materials and the distribution of finished products. 
 Scenarios of concern, similar to the design basis threat in use in the nuclear sector,  
include improvised explosive devices (IEDs), VBIEDs, rocket-propelled grenades, 
improvised rockets, and mortars.  The worst case consequence scenarios developed by 
EPA generally over estimate the actual results of a terrorist attack.  This is due to the fact 
that they do not take into account safety features at the facility or limit the effects to the 
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population in the downwind direction.  The release consequences will be affected by the 
source (e.g., release rate, release duration, and toxicity), meteorology (wind speed, wind 
direction, atmospheric stability, precipitation), and population (e.g., population 
distribution and structural protection; response action) factors.56  However, since EPA’s 
worst case scenarios base the release on the failure of the largest single vessel at the site, 
the estimate may become more accurate if multiple simultaneous vessels are breached. 
 
G. INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY 
 The requirement to evaluate Inherently Safer Technology (IST) has been 
historically a very controversial issue in terms of safety and security initiatives within the 
chemical industry.  The concept of IST was introduced approximately thirty years ago as 
a process safety initiative.  IST studies have been widely performed by industry since that 
time.  As a result of the events of September 11, the application of IST as a method to 
reduce the risk of a terrorist attack has gained significant support.  The most desirable 
solution to preventing a chemical release is to reduce or eliminate the hazard where 
possible, not simply to control it.57 
 Advocates of IST cite the inherent overlap between process safety and homeland 
security and note that the implementation of such measures would directly reduce 
security risks since the hazard would be potentially replaced or reduced.  Industry 
associations have generally been resistant to legislation mandating the evaluation and/or 
implementation of IST.  Industry takes the position that decisions regarding IST are 
weighed on a process and facility basis, and are routinely considered by process 
engineers when optimizing and assessing process change.58  There are also concerns for 
the potential of negative safety impacts such as increasing transportation of hazardous 
materials and transferring risk to other areas that may result if IST approaches are 
incorrectly implemented.  This leads back to the question of whether regulation of IST is 
more appropriate in an agency staffed with process safety experts as opposed to 
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individuals with experience in homeland security.  Critics are likely to question EPA and 
OSHA homeland security expertise but just as likely will question the background or 
readiness of DHS staff to make complex chemical risk assessments. 
 The potential to effectively implement IST occurs during the design process when 
there remains a great deal of flexibility in terms of materials, operations, and physical 
location.  However, major enhancements to the inherent safety of existing chemical 
plants have been reported.59  Unfortunately, many times it is not clear which of several 
process alternatives is inherently safer.  Because nearly all chemical processes have a 
number of hazards associated with them, an alternative which reduces one hazard may 
increase a different hazard.60 
 Information is not available to fully answer the question of how many chemicals 
defined by the EPA as extraordinarily hazardous substances have scientifically proven 
alternatives that increase safety, reduce risk, and operate at least as effectively, in terms 
of cost and end product, as the substance being replaced.  However, some examples of 
New Jersey IST successes include: 
• Over twenty wastewater facilities have switched from using chlorine to 
sodium hypochlorite for disinfection of their treated wastewater. 
• Four electric generation and cogeneration plants substituted anhydrous 
ammonia with aqueous ammonia for use in their air pollution control 
systems. 
• One facility switched from chlorine to bromochlorohydantoin for use as an 
algaecide in treating cooling water. 
• One facility switched from bulk storage of liquid sulfur trioxide to on-site 
generation of gaseous sulfur trioxide for direct consumption into the 
process. 
• One facility switched from bulk storage of chlorine to on-site generation 
of ozone for disinfection of potable water. 
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• Another facility is proposing to switch from bulk storage of chlorine to on-
site generation of chlorine dioxide for paper bleaching. 
For a particular process or chemical product being manufactured, substitution may not be 
a feasible alternative, but use of one or more of the other three IST techniques could 
provide a feasible reduction in risk.  The National Research Council has recommended to 
DHS as part of science and technology investment, to research the development of 
inherently safer alternatives and apply them to current processes that require high 
volumes of toxic or flammable materials.61  
 It would be difficult to provide a defined list of required specific ISTs or 
equipment because each chemical process must be evaluated individually.  Also, many 
processes are proprietary.  It is possible to provide guidance on technologies or 
equipment for consideration by facilities in their process.  This guidance could be 
prepared with input and assistance from academia, government, industry, and 
organizations such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety, the American Chemistry 
Council, and the American Petroleum Institute.  Rather than accepting the hazards in a 
process, and then adding on safety systems and layers of protection to control those 
hazards, the process designer is challenged to reconsider the process and eliminate the 
hazards.62  Publicizing the virtues of IST beyond the process safety community and into 
the broader chemistry and chemical engineering community is necessary.63 
 Performing an IST evaluation and implementing IST or other risk reduction 
measures provide several positive benefits resulting in a more stable business plan for a 
facility.  First of all, the reduction in risk lowers potential liabilities.  This has the 
secondary benefit of increasing the surrounding community’s perception, confidence, and 
acceptance of the facility.  Many IST alternatives, which have an initial capital cost, 
result in lower operating costs in areas such as maintenance, operations, and emergency 
response requirements.  However, even when the benefits of an inherently less safe 
technology justify its use, we should always continue to look for inherently safer 
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alternatives.  Technology continues to evolve and advance, and inherently safer 
alternatives which are not economically attractive today may be very attractive in the 
near future.64 If the risk of release can be eliminated or substantially reduced, the facility 
would become less attractive to a terrorist and thus less likely a terrorist target.  Reducing 
or eliminating the risk of a release, whether caused by terrorism or occurring 
accidentally, would avoid business losses from a production shutdown following the 
incident.  All of these serve to provide the facility a more stable business plan. 
 
H. STAKEHOLDER PUBLIC HEARINING 
 On December 1, 2005 the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
held a public hearing to solicit comments on chemical plant safety.  Specifically, the 
NJDEP was interested in suggestions on areas where the Chemical Sector Best Practices 
could be strengthened and under what circumstances inherently safer technology should 
be required.  This was the first public hearing of this type for any security best practices 
endorsed by the New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force and approved 
by the Governor.  Written comments were accepted until January 5, 2006.   A wide 
variety of stakeholders were represented at the hearing, including the following list of 
organizations that offered testimony. 
• Chemistry Council of New Jersey 
• New Jersey Assemblyman – District 3 
• American Chemistry Council 
• New Jersey Work Environment Council 
• Akzo Nobel 
• Lubrizol Dock Resins 
• New Jersey Public Interest Research Group 
• United States Steel Workers 
• Noveon Specialty Chemicals 
• Air Products and Chemicals 
• National Paint and Coatings Association 
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• New Jersey Sierra Club 
• New Jersey Environmental Foundation 
• BASF Corporation 
• New Jersey State Industrial Union Council 
• Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility 
• Cease Fire New Jersey 
In general, all parties in attendance were appreciative of the opportunity to 
comment on the Chemical Sector Best Practices.  The Chemistry Council of New Jersey 
estimated that, since September 11, over a hundred million dollars had been spent by 
their members in New Jersey to harden facilities, increase security and put assets into 
place to protect workers and the public.65  These results demonstrated that a cooperative 
relationship was much better than a prescribed regulatory regimen because the issue was 
too important to leave to regulations.66  A misdirected regulatory approach which 
penalizes those facilities that have voluntarily safeguarded their assets has the potential to 
drive those manufacturing jobs out of New Jersey.  Criticism of the Best Practices 
centered around the fact that there was no participation mechanism to allow workers, 
union representatives, environmental groups, and members of the public to play a role in 
the development and implementation of this initiative.  Paul Renner, representing the 
United States Steel Workers, emphasized the vital necessity of training for workers to 
equip them with skills and language necessary to play fully in the process and be able to 
articulate their concerns and recommendations for making their facilities less vulnerable 
to consequences of an intentional act.67  The workers who run the processes often know 
as much, if not more, about the intimacies of the process than the engineers themselves.  
Suzanne Leta, an advocate with the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group 
expressed concerns that the Responsible Care program is a product of industry self 
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regulation and, as a voluntary industry endeavor, the chemical industry is not accountable 
to the public or to the government to provide complete safety.68 
In terms of inherently safer technologies (IST), the American Chemistry Council 
took the position that it was not appropriate to address this concern through a regulatory 
process. They cited a variety of reasons including the lack of established measurement 
methodologies and the complexity of chemical processes.  Inherent safety is not fully 
understood, so regulating it and forcing change against accepted good engineering 
practices with a long history of safe performance is not recommended.69  One facility 
manager raised the concern that IST is already part of their evaluation process and to 
require the resources to be committed to existing product formulations without 
consideration for the benefit, merely weakens the overall security effort.  Customers are 
not willing to pay extra for inherently safer ingredients.70  The separation of IST and 
security requirements was also mentioned as it was posited that New Jersey should 
continue to address implementing best security measures but leave issues concerning 
chemical processes separate from the issue of plant security.  IST is a process safety issue 
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II. POLICY OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are three proposed alternative solutions.  A critical evaluation of the 
voluntary efforts by industry to date may demonstrate that the public is adequately 
protected and no further action is required – this constitutes the first alternative.  The 
sources used in this evaluation included the Department of Homeland Security, 
Congressional Research Service, National Research Council, Government Accountability 
Office, testimony of industry experts, success/failure of analogous regulatory programs, 
and personal experience regulating the New Jersey chemical industry.  If security 
deficiencies are found to exist in the industry a second alternative is to assemble a plan 
for a more effective policy through regulation.  Regulation in this case would be typical 
command and control prescriptive language.  General examples of the requirements could 
include specific height requirements for perimeter fencing, detailed procedures for 
background checks of all individuals entering the site, and cyber protocols complying 
with a nationally accepted standard.  In simplistic terms a voluntary approach requires 
considering security upgrades whereas regulations mandate implementation of upgrades.  
Regulation would also add another element to the process, government inspection and 
enforcement of the law. A third and final alternative is a combination of the voluntary 
and mandatory approach to achieve an acceptable standard of security throughout the 
chemical sector. To provide consistency and fairness to industry regulation should be at 
the federal level, but could be achieved at the State level if necessary.  This alternative 
would require little or no immediate action from companies that have voluntarily 
safeguarded their facility but would include prescriptive standards for those that were 
found to be non compliant. There is an assumption that is stated in the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security that rigid regulation has proven to be an inefficient means of 
meeting objectives.72  However, Dr. Linda Greer of the Center for American Progress 
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posits that the issue is not voluntary versus mandatory approaches but the question is 
whether the critical infrastructure is adequately protected.73 
The potential strengths and weaknesses of each policy option will be measured by 
the following five criteria: potential to adequately safeguard the industry, requirements 
are practical and economically feasible taking into account the potential risk posed and 
the financial ability to mitigate such, addresses the varied concerns of all stakeholders to 
the maximum extent possible, the ability to efficiently inspect and evaluate compliance at 
each site, and a communicable metric to determine effectiveness. 
A key issue that must be determined with these alternatives is which 
governmental agency should be given the responsibility to oversee this sector and at what 
level.  The criterion to be considered in this case is the feasibility of an agency 
undertaking this responsibility. This capacity will be based on technical expertise, 
experience, resources, and other related factors necessary to provide adequate oversight 
of the chemical industry.  Options include the DHS, the EPA, or possibly a delegation of 
such authority to state government similar to some existing environmental protection 
laws.  Analysts have suggested an approach combining the skills of both DHS and EPA 
in overseeing chemical facility security.74  Since the population potentially affected by a 
chemical release generally resides near specific facilities, some experts may argue that 
chemical facility concerns should be dealt with by state or local authorities.  Delegation 
to the state level would reduce the burden placed on federal agencies.  Other experts 
claim the potentially catastrophic nature of a terrorist attack and the widespread 
distribution of chemical facilities make chemical facility security an issue of national 
concern.75 In addition, it must be determined if industry should bear the cost for this 
initiative or be supplemented in whole or in part by the federal government to ease the 
economic burden.  Industry acceptance of any new initiative will be driven primarily by 
the source of the funding.  The legality issue is of prime importance since the ACC will 
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most likely challenge any action that requires the investment of significant resources 
above what member companies have spent since September 11.   
The successful alternative must protect critical infrastructure, address economic 
feasibility, gain bipartisan political support, have the capacity to be successfully 
implemented and inspected, and provide a reasonable and communicable metric to 
determine effectiveness for all criteria.  There must be clear evidence that the proposal 
would safeguard the chemical industry.  The cost to implement such safeguards, whether 
it is target hardening, additional personnel, or inherently safer technology changes must 
be balanced against the potential to save lives.  The ultimate first priority is to save lives 
but due consideration must be given to protecting the economy and the industry itself.  
 The DHS, through the American Society of Mechanical Engineers developed the 
Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP), which is 
currently being employed in the chemical industry under a pilot program.  RAMCAP is 
an overall strategy and methodology to allow for a more consistent and systematic 
analysis of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities against the U.S. infrastructure using a 
risk-based framework.76  The sector-specific vulnerability assessment tool being 
developed is: 
• Based upon specific metrics, the use of which is repeatable sector to 
sector; thereby allowing cross-sector comparative risk assessment. 
• Designed to employ specific, defined consequence generators (threat 
scenarios); 
• Designed to evaluate: 
o Consequences (impact produced by the defined consequence 
generator); 
o Vulnerabilities (potential point targets and/or attack vectors, a 
broadly accepted surrogate for frequency/probability of success of 
an attack); 
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o Countermeasures (including factors in mitigation, deterrent factors, 
detection factors, delay factors, response capability, and inherent 
robustness); 
o Actions/countermeasures at different threat levels; 
o Residual security vulnerability (gap analysis).77 
 The alternative must have the potential to gain bipartisan support from federal, 
state, and local officials.  Regardless of the government agency tasked to administer this 
program, it must have the capacity to be reasonably implemented and audited.  The final 
criterion is the requirement of a metric, understandable to both subject matter experts and 
the general public that conveys the effectiveness of the effort.  The criteria are ranked as 
listed but the political process may reorder one or more of the items.   
 
B. POLICY OPTION 1: NO FURTHER ACTION 
The outcome of the first alternative, no action, is expected to result in large 
companies with the ability and motivation to adequately safeguard their assets assuming 
that they agree that the costs of target hardening are necessary.  In addition, insurance 
may be the chosen option if it makes more fiscal sense than the expensive process of 
target hardening for a rare and unique event such as a terrorist attack.  Smaller facilities 
and those economically challenged will most likely be found to be deficient in their 
security preparedness efforts. The mechanism to be used to assess this option is New 
Jersey’s Best Practice Standards (Standards) issued on November 21, 2005. The 
Standards cover 157 chemical facilities and require each site to examine vulnerabilities 
and hazards that might be exploited by potential terrorists.   This information must be 
available for evaluation by March 21, 2006 and will provide an industry baseline and a 
framework in which to direct future policy in this area. The no action alternative fails to 
protect the critical infrastructure, would not satisfy political concerns that regulation is 
necessary, and would provide no metric to determine effectiveness.  In addition, there is 
no enforcement mechanism beyond association sanctions or expulsion for members who 
do not meet voluntary standards set by an industry organization.  The DHS testified that 
approximately 20 percent of the facilities DHS classified as high risk do not participate in 
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any voluntary security program.78 However, since the approach remains voluntary, 
economic feasibility and program implementation would not be a factor in this scenario. 
This policy option would continue the ongoing Chemical Comprehensive Review 
(CR) undertaken by DHS. The CR is a cooperative government-led analysis of Critical 
Infrastructure/Key Resource (CI/KR) within the chemical manufacturing sector.79  The 
purpose of the CR is to enhance public safety by integrating all levels of government 
effort to prevent and protect against potential terrorist attack.  The CR also represents an 
all hazards approach as it provides an opportunity to identify and implement best 
practices that may also apply to other catastrophic events.  The program is voluntary and 
led by the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection.  Additional team members include: 
• DHS Risk Management Division which is responsible for the overall 
coordination of the program and also provides assault planning expertise 
including physical security and explosive ordnance disposal, and provide 
technical assistance for buffer zone plans. 
• DHS Chemical and Nuclear Protection and Preparedness Division 
Chemical Sector Specific Agency which is responsible for identifying the 
regions in which to conduct the CRs. 
• DHS Emergency Services Sector responsible to lead workshops to assess 
emergency planning and preparedness and collect information from 
stakeholders including plans, strategies, and prior assessments. 
• DHS United States Coast Guard which leads maritime security 
assessment. 
• DHS Transportation Security Administration which assesses the security 
of chemical transport within the region. 
• DHS National Cyber Security Division 
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• Federal Bureau of Investigation which participates in law enforcement 
assessments and supports tactical response planning.80 
DHS is in the process of conducting CRs on groupings of potentially high-
consequence chemical facilities in the following six regions: 
• Detroit River, MI 
• Los Angeles, CA 
• Chicago, IL 
• Northern New Jersey 
• Lower Delaware River Valley (New Jersey/Delaware/Pennsylvania 
junction) 
• Houston, TX81 
The three primary components of the CR include Buffer Zone Protection Program 
Technical Visits, Community Capability Assessment Tool (C-CAT) Workshops, and 
Emergency Services Capability Assessment (ESCA).  The DHS Risk Management 
Division will provide technical assistance for local law enforcement representatives and 
emergency responders to complete buffer zone plans for selected chemical facilities.82  
The C-CAT is used by participating community representatives to assess their agency’s 
capabilities.  C-CAT is a self assessment of emergency services disciplines that provides 
an overview of current capabilities that can be used to identify gaps and options for 
consideration to improve the security around fixed chemical facilities.83  The final CR 
component, ESCA, is designed to examine regional capabilities in the event of a terrorist 
attack.  A series of discussions are scheduled to analyze regional capabilities with facility 
representatives encouraged to provide specific information on necessary response actions.  
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At the end of these round tables DHS will provide a preliminary review of potential gaps 
in emergency services planning and preparedness.84 
 
C. POLICY OPTION 2: PRESCRIPTIVE REGULATIONS 
The second alternative, a mandatory approach through regulation, has the 
potential to protect the chemical industry and allows the creation of an overall strategy to 
reasonably implement, oversee, and determine the effectiveness of the program.  This 
dynamic changes depending on the organization charged with this responsibility, but 
these criteria could be satisfied regardless.  However, the alternative has the potential to 
be prohibitively expensive and would be opposed by those officials supporting a 
voluntary approach.  In addition, the overall cost to the economy must be taken into 
account through an economic analysis of stricter regulation.  Security standards must be 
implemented with safeguards that protect the private sector from undue burdens that 
would add little real security but would undermine competition, cost jobs, and make 
goods and services more expensive.85 
It is useful to mention the experience of the nuclear industry since the events of 
September 11 to provide context to the potential of prescriptive regulations to be 
prohibitively expensive.  Security forces at nuclear plants were increased by one-third to 
approximately 8,000 officers at 103 plants located at 64 sites.  Additional security 
measures included: 
• extending and fortifying security perimeters; 
• increasing patrols within security zones; 
• installing new barriers to protect against vehicle bombs; 
• installing additional high-tech surveillance equipment; 
                                                 
84 Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet, Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure, 
Chemical Comprehensive Review, Emergency Services Capability Assessment (Washington, D.C.: DHS,  
2006), 1. 
85 James Jay Carafano, Congressional Checklist for Chemical Security (Washington, D.C.:Heritage 
Foundation, May 17, 2006), available at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/em1000.cfm 
(Accessed November 8, 2006). 
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• strengthening coordination of security efforts with local, state, and federal 
agencies to integrate approaches among the entities. 
In total, the nuclear industry has spent 1.2 billion dollars in security-related 
improvements since September 11.86  This equates to 18.75 million dollars per site in the 
last five years.  The purpose of this example is not to suggest comparisons between the 
security needs of the chemical and nuclear industries but rather to demonstrate the 
potential for significant capital expenditures resulting from prescriptive regulations. 
 The United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs convened a series of hearings to examine the issue of chemical facility security.  
At the end of the 109th Congress, the Senate and House of Representatives reached a 
compromise that led to the Department of Homeland Security being granted the 
regulatory authority to safeguard chemical facilities.  This compromise demonstrates the 
strong opposition to the implementation of prescriptive regulations similar in nature to 
those governing the nuclear industry. 
 
D. POLICY OPTION 3: COMBINATION OF A MANDATORY AND 
VOLUNTARY APPROACH 
 The final solution has the potential to satisfy all of the criteria if the law and 
regulations appropriately balance the concerns mentioned above.  The targeted 
companies in this scenario would be those operations found to be non compliant with the 
ACC’s Responsible Care Security Code or alternate methodology that has been 
determined to be equivalent by the Center for Chemical Process Safety.  The political 
debate will determine if the consensus leads too far to the status quo or to the prescriptive 
regulatory approach of the second alternative.  If bipartisan support can be achieved and a 
reasonable standard set for cost effectiveness the outcome would be successful. 
The recommended solution, as can be seen by the potential for success, is a 
combination of a voluntary and mandatory approach to safeguarding the chemical 
industry from terrorist attack.  However, as demonstrated in the analysis, the success of 
                                                 
86 Nuclear Energy Institute, Post-Sept. 11 Security Enhancements: More Personnel, Patrols, 
Equipment, Barriers (Nuclear Energy Institute: Washington, D.C., 2006), available at: 
http://www.nei.org/index.asp?catnum=2&catid=275 (Accessed February 12, 2007). 
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this alternative is dependent upon appropriate decision making throughout the process 
that is consistent with the ranked criteria.  If one or more of the criteria is ignored or 
circumvented the outcome may be no better than that of the status quo of the first 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The first step in this process is to critically evaluate the chemical industry’s 
compliance with the New Jersey Standards.  This research will focus on the chemical 
facilities located in New Jersey but will be broad enough to be applied at a national level.   
The audience is the general public and their elected representatives that live and 
work within the impact areas of facilities that store and handle extraordinarily hazardous 
substances and the government officials responsible for regulating the sector and 
directing policy.  Key stakeholders in the process include the chemical industry, 
environmental groups, and the general public.   
Based upon these results the appropriate policy option will be selected and a 
recommendation satisfying the previously mentioned criteria for success will be 
formulated.  The comments received from the interested parties will be critically 
analyzed to develop a sound policy proposal for the future. This research will provide a 
basis for elected officials and government leaders to determine the future policy direction 
relating to protecting the critical infrastructure of the chemical industry and most 
importantly the lives of those living in the surrounding area. 
Strategy Canvas 
A strategy canvas was constructed comparing the voluntary approach which has 
been in effect since shortly after September 11 with the mandatory approach that DHS is 
mandated to have in place by April 4, 2007 pursuant to P.L. 109-125.  The criteria for the 
canvas include the ability to protect critical infrastructure, address economic feasibility, 
gain bipartisan political support, have the capacity to be successfully implemented and 
inspected, and provide a reasonable and communicable metric to determine effectiveness. 
The strategy canvas demonstrated that the regulatory approach was significantly 
more effective in three areas: 
• Protecting critical infrastructure – Based on EPA data there are 14,600 
chemical facilities subject to the CAA 112r risk management program 
requirements.  A total of only 1,100 of those facilities are members of an 
organization that currently has formal security guidelines in effect.  
Therefore, a voluntary approach results in a significant gap in the number 
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of facilities of concern that could reasonably be expected to follow 
appropriate methodology to secure their assets. 
• Reasonable and communicable metric - There is no current mechanism 
and it would be difficult to implement any type of effective metric in a 
voluntary framework.  However, a regulatory approach provides an 
opportunity to incorporate multiple types of metrics evaluated through an 
audit and/or inspection program. 
• Political support – As can be seen with the recent issuance of P.L. 109-125 
and the most recent legislative proposal, the September 29, 2006 amended 
version of H.R. 5695, there is strong support for a regulatory approach.  In 
addition, based on the recent election results, it is likely that the more 
prescriptive measures included in H.R. 5695 will gain additional support. 
There are two areas of divergence that result from the canvas.  These two items are 
critical as acceptable solutions have the potential to lead to a strategic innovation.  These 
are the two criteria that with the examined business lines favor a voluntary approach: 
• Economic feasibility – The majority of economic costs associated with the 
voluntary approach have already been borne by those facilities that have 
chosen to institute security enhancements.  Any standard regulatory 
program would create an additional burden to industry with the fear of the 
extent of such an impact being the prime motivation to object to such an 
approach. 
• Potential for successful implementation - The voluntary approach has been 
in effect for five years and no additional resource allocations would be 
necessary to continue forward.  The regulatory approach will require 
resources at the federal and possibly state/local level to establish an 
effective oversight program. 




• Existing relationship with the chemical industry 
• Familiarity with the sites in question 
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• Experience in rule making, compliance oversight, and enforcement 
• Strong community reputation 
Weaknesses: 
 
• Unfunded mandate, utilization of existing, limited resources 
• Staff expertise is engineering, not security 
• Historical focus of command and control 
• Additional training required 
Opportunities: 
 
• Significant public interest in potential chemical industry risks 
• Industry incentive to strengthen security perception 
• Legislative support for action 
• Standards results provide a baseline for policy recommendations 
Threats (Challenges): 
 
• Resistance from strong chemical industry lobby 
• Adequate funding source 
• Maintaining distinction between environmental and security duties 
• Requirements must be practical and economically feasible 
• Bipartisan support may prove difficult to achieve 
There are five main strategic issues resulting from the SWOT analysis: 
 
1. How does the NJDEP secure the appropriate resources to fund the proposed 
initiative? 
2. What is the best mechanism to solicit stakeholder input and increase the likelihood of 
bipartisan support? 
3. What should be the communicable metric to determine the effectiveness of the 
selected alternative? 
4. What methodology is necessary to ensure that the regulatory requirements are 
practical and economically feasible? 
5. Should inherently safer technology evaluations be part of security regulations or is it 
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IV. BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS COMPLIANCE STATUS 
SUMMARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Originally, 157 facilities were notified that they were subject to the Best Practice 
Standards (Standards) and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
(NJDEP) would conduct site inspections at those facilities to verify compliance with the 
Standards.  Since that time, six facilities are no longer subject to the Standards as their 
operations changed such that they are no longer subject to the Toxic Catastrophe 
Prevention Act (TCPA) and/or the Discharge Prevention, Containment, and 
Countermeasure (DPCC) program.  The NJDEP completed the Standards inspections in 
November 2006 with a total of approximately 300 site visits.  Follow up inspections were 
conducted at facilities determined to be non-compliant after the initial audit. 
 
B. SUMMARY OF COMPLIANCE STATUS 
 Initial compliance inspections were conducted at all of the original 157 facilities.  
Letters were sent to all of these facilities informing them of whether they had 
demonstrated compliance with the Standards or whether any deficiencies exist that must 
be addressed.  Initially, ninety-eight (62 percent) of the facilities demonstrated 
compliance with the Standards.  Facilities were given 30 days to satisfactorily resolve any 
outstanding compliance issues.  The most common deficiencies were not conducting a 
proper security vulnerability assessment utilizing an approved methodology and not 
affording employees a reasonable opportunity to identify security issues.  General 
compliance with the Standards has been achieved by 144 of the 154 facilities currently 
subject to the Standards.  Follow-up inspections are on going at the remaining 10 
facilities to ensure that the noted deficiencies are corrected. 
 Initially only 42 of the 98 facilities subject to the TCPA regulations reported 
SIC/NAIC code designations specified in the Standards and were required to conduct an 
inherently safer technology (IST) evaluation.  All 42 of these facilities have documented 
that they have previously implemented IST or similar risk reduction measures.  Thirteen 
(32 percent) of the facilities have provided a schedule to implement additional IST or 
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other risk reduction measures, and eight (19 percent) have identified additional IST or 
risk reduction measures but have not yet scheduled their completion.  The remaining 
twenty (49 percent) facilities had no additional recommendations.  It should be noted that 
these are facilities that have been regulated under the TCPA program for many years 
resulting in the past implementation of IST and risk reduction measures.  Thirty-three (80 
percent) of the facilities concluded that at least some of the IST or risk reduction 
measures identified during their evaluation were infeasible for their operations. 
 These compliance results clearly indicate that the evaluation of IST is not overly 
burdensome on industry and is an effective tool for critically evaluating the risk reduction 
opportunities available at a specific facility.  In addition, none of the companies regulated 
under the Standards brought up concerns about going out of business due to the existence 
of these additional regulatory requirements for homeland security. 
 
C. NEXT STEPS 
 It is expected that eventual compliance with the requirements mandated in the 
Standards will exceed 98 percent.  The two percent of facilities that are expected to be 
deemed out of compliance with all or some portion of the Standards equate to 
approximately 3 to 5 facilities.  The cost of conducting a proper security vulnerability 
assessment utilizing an approved methodology is likely to be the main reason for 
prolonged noncompliance.  These facilities are limited to those designated in terms of 
critical infrastructure to be Tier 3.  These facilities are non critical infrastructure as 
defined by the Department of Homeland Security and the New Jersey Office of 
Homeland Security and Preparedness (OHSP), have no off site consequences in terms of 
a release, and are generally barely above the TCPA/DPCC regulatory thresholds.  If 
compliance is not achieved in a reasonable time frame, or at least significant progress 
toward that goal is not demonstrated, the companies in question will be referred to the 
OHSP for appropriate action. 
 
D. STANDARDS – LESSONS LEARNED 
 New Jersey embarked into a new area of regulation with the issuance of the 
Standards in November 2005 and similar to many new initiatives there were many 
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lessons learned throughout the creation and implementation process.  The following 
outlines those lessons to provide a foundation for recommendations of future action in the 
area of chemical facility security.  These lessons are not ranked in order of significance 
but simply in the order they appear in the Standards. 
 
Defining the Chemical Sector Universe 
 The scope of the Standards included those facilities subject to New Jersey’s Toxic 
Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) and Discharge Prevention, Containment and 
Countermeasure (DPCC) program that reported chemical industry classification codes as 
their primary business activity.  These codes included Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) major groups: 28 (chemical and allied products), 30 (rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products), 5169 (chemicals and allied products, not elsewhere classified), or the 
corresponding North American Industry Classification codes (325, 326, and 424690).  
The primary purpose of defining the facilities by industry classification was to focus the 
Standards on the intended target of the chemical industry.  The TCPA and DPCC 
programs regulate many companies in the petroleum, water, wastewater, food, energy, 
and other industries. 
 It was evident after implementation of the Standards that the self reporting 
requirements of the industrial classification system resulted in a universe that included 
facilities that were not considered part of the chemical sector and also omitted some 
facilities that were considered critical chemical infrastructure.  In addition, there were 
also cases where two facilities that stored identical amounts of extraordinarily hazardous 
substances were treated differently simply due to the fact that one reported an industry 
code that was not included in the scope of the Standards.  Although these cases were the 
minority since the Standards captured the bulk of the expected facilities, future actions 
must take into account the inherent limitations of the SIC/NAIC system for chemical 
security applications. 
 
Qualified Security Expert 
 The Standards required facilities to employ a qualified security expert (who could 
be an employee of the facility or its parent company) to conduct a security vulnerability 
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assessment.  There was no specific definition of a qualified security expert included 
within the Standards.  This led to numerous determinations by the NJDEP that the 
individuals tasked to complete the assessments were not qualified or did not have the 
appropriate background to conduct such an evaluation.  Examples included facility 
employees and outside consultants that were well versed in areas such as chemical 
process safety and plant management but had little or no security related experience.  
These situations were resolved either by utilizing corporate security experts or employing 
an outside security consultant.  The cost of consulting services, which were in the range 
of $20,000 for a small facility, was a significant obstacle for companies with limited 
resources.  In an effort to alleviate this burden, the New Jersey Office of Homeland 
Security and Preparedness through the 21 county critical infrastructure agencies offered 
assistance in the evaluation of the security vulnerability assessment.  A detailed definition 
of the necessary qualifications of the individual(s) conducting the assessment is vital to 
ensure the quality of the final evaluation. 
 
Qualified Process Safety Expert 
 The Standards required an Inherently Safer Technology evaluation be performed 
at those facilities subject to the TCPA program.  These evaluations were to be conducted 
by a qualified expert in chemical process safety.  Once again there was no specific 
definition of what constituted a qualified process safety expert.  In this case there were 
only minor problems resulting from a lack of a definition since the facilities already had 
process safety experts on staff or had hired a consultant in the past to complete process 
hazard analyses and other risk management program items required by the TCPA 
program.  However, for clarity and ease of implementation, a definition of the necessary 
qualifications and experience to be considered a process safety expert is recommended to 
be included in any future regulation. 
 
Inspection of Evaluations 
 The Standards required that all assessments, plans, reports, and reviews required 
by the Standards be maintained on site for evaluation by representatives of NJDEP or the 
Task Force during normal business hours.  The premise for retaining the information on 
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site instead of submitting the information to the NJDEP was the concern regarding the 
ability of the NJDEP to adequately protect the information.  The concerns included 
adequate protocol and safeguard mechanisms at the NJDEP offices and protection from 
New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act.  The industry concerns were not without merit 
but the efficiency of the inspection process was definitely hampered by this requirement.  
Additional NJDEP and industry resources were required as additional site visits were 
necessary for follow up visits that could have been completed through submissions and 
evaluations in the office.  Detailed handling and storage protocol and legislative 
protection from public information requests must be implemented to permit sensitive 
information to be submitted to the public agency charged with the responsibility for 
chemical facility security. 
 A related issued, not specifically mentioned in the Standards, is the background 
check or lack thereof of the government employees that have access to the sensitive 
documents.  The NJDEP staff are not required to have any type of background check to 
perform these types of inspections nor is it mandated that they be U.S. citizens.  This 
issue was brought up by a number of facilities that require detailed background checks of 
their own employees before they are hired or at minimum before they can access or 
handle sensitive information.  The strongest objections came from facilities that were also 
subject to the Maritime Transportation Security Act which prohibits the release of any 
sensitive security information to any individual that has not undergone a prescribed 
background evaluation.  In the case of the Coast Guard these issues were resolved 
through the Sensitive Security Information non disclosure forms which were executed by 
NJDEP staff.  Future consideration should be given to administering adequate 
background checks for all government employees that are required as part of the job 
responsibilities to access, evaluate, or process security related information. 
 On December 19, 2006, New Jersey Governor Jon S. Corzine signed a Senate 
Committee substitute for Senate Bill Nos. 462 and 1289 which requires independent 
contractors to submit to background checks to work within facilities subject to the 
NJTCPA program.  The Department of Law and Public Safety is required to perform 
criminal history record background checks on applicants employed by or to be employed 
by independent contractors determined to working in a critical position.  At a minimum, 
56
these checks include a credit investigation, a Social Security number verification to detect 
informational inconsistencies, and a cross-referencing of all applicants against 
appropriate law enforcement advisories and terror watch lists.  This act takes effect 270 
days after enactment, except that the Attorney General, Director of the Office of 
Homeland Security and Preparedness, and the Commissioner of Environmental 
Protection may, prior to the effective date, take such anticipatory action as shall be 
necessary for the implementation of this act. 
 These lessons learned should not be seen as a failure of the overall Standards 
initiative but rather unforeseen consequences that can be used to improve any similar 
programs in the future.  The Standards compliance results were very positive and industry 
preparedness and willingness to correct outstanding deficiencies exceeded the 
expectations of many of the stakeholders involved in the process.  The voluntary 
approach for chemical security and the term cooperative seemingly go hand in hand in 
most security discussions.  However, the Standards were a mandatory requirement and 
the industry cooperation, in most cases, was positive and unchanged from that of the 


























The conclusions of this research and the recommendations to address chemical 
facility security focus on the appropriate legislative approach, responsible government 
agency, scope of the chemical universe, public preparation, and inherently safer 
technology.  There are also many other suggestions included within these topics. 
 
B. LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 
The suggested policy direction resembles a standard regulatory approach but 
would be modified to address the economic and implementation issues associated with a 
typical command and control structure.  The economic impacts have the potential to be 
mitigated by rewarding those facilities that have voluntarily adequately protected their 
assets.  These rewards could be in the form of recognition, less government oversight 
(tiering the regulations), and auditing the facilities versus the standard inspection and 
enforcement visits.  The proposal to audit is in the context of compliance assistance 
instead of administrative and criminal penalties that result from enforcement inspections. 
Economic impacts to smaller facilities without the financial ability to invest substantial 
resources can potentially be reduced by tiering requirements based upon the risk 
associated with a particular site.  Tax incentives and grant or low interest loans are also 
an option for consideration.   
The Standards demonstrated that significant investment by the chemical industry, 
estimated to be 100 million dollars in New Jersey alone, for security enhancements have 
been made since September 11.  These voluntary efforts should be appropriately 
recognized in the regulations.  Initial baseline evaluations of the universe to determine 
compliance will permit such recognition and allow facilities to be classified as compliant.  
Therefore, the onus on facilities that have truly made adequate efforts to safeguard their 
assets will be limited to demonstrating such actions through documentation and 
participation in a site audit.  It is important to note that significant monetary investment 
does not in and of itself guarantee full compliance with risk-based standards as it is 
unknown if such enhancements were appropriately targeted.  
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Government oversight should be prioritized by the risk posed and the 
vulnerabilities determined to exist at the facility.  Companies adhering to industry best 
practices and satisfactorily resolving outstanding deficiencies would require less initial 
oversight and qualify for a more conservative audit frequency schedule in the future.  
Assuming there are no major changes at the facility that would require reevaluation of the 
vulnerability assessment or other security protocol revisions, the responsible agency can 
then divert limited resources to those facilities that are determined to be non-compliant 
with the regulations.  The type of oversight, audit versus inspection, is also a critical 
component of this proposal.  6 CFR 27.240(a)3 stipulates that the DHS will not 
disapprove a Site Security Plan based on the presence or absence of a particular security 
measure.  Audit visits focused on compliance assistance will leverage the public and 
private sector expertise and permit the facility to implement the measures determined to 
be most effective at that particular site to attain compliance with the standards.  
Inspections combined with the threat of administrative and criminal penalties are 
generally less effective and have the potential to result in enhancements that meet the 
letter of the rule but are not the best solution to a specific deficiency.  However, the audit 
methodology if unsuccessful would lead to a traditional enforcement response through 
mandatory penalties to attain compliance. 
Economic impacts, especially for smaller facilities, must be taken into 
consideration.  In general, these facilities pose less risk due to a catastrophic release and 
shouldn’t be held to the same standard as a company that would impact a significant 
number of people.  However, the cost of conducting even a security vulnerability 
analysis, even if no further actions are deemed necessary, can be a significant obstacle to 
a company.  Compliance assistance, grants, tax incentives, and low interest loans are 
possible alternatives to alleviate this burden.  A mechanism would be required to be built 
into the regulations, possibly based on the size of the company or gross revenue to 
determine applicability of such assistance. 
 
C. RESPONSIBLE AGENCY 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), consistent with P.L. 109-125, is 
the governmental agency best suited to undertake the responsibility for the promulgation 
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and implementation of chemical security requirements.  In consideration of the lack of 
chemical process safety expertise within DHS and limited historical knowledge of the 
CAA 112r sites, a close partnership with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
required to address gaps and overlaps between security and process safety. 
The proposal is centered on delegating oversight responsibility to the state level.  
DHS is not currently staffed to evaluate 14,600 facilities and it is not realistic that any 
one agency could effectively handle such a universe.  DHS would still be the responsible 
regulatory agency but would delegate the responsibility, similar to how EPA has handled 
air and water regulations and states obtaining Agreement State status from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.  In the case of the former, many states have an overarching 
Performance Partnership Agreement with EPA which guides the efficient administration 
of both Federal and State resources toward the common goal of environmental protection.  
This approach may serve as a model for delegated homeland security programs.  The 
specific state agency tasked with this responsibility is likely to vary depending on the 
existing and potential capabilities of the current State homeland security and 
environmental protection agencies.  It is also likely that a number of states may not be 
interested or have the resources to assume a delegation status.  In those cases, DHS 
would retain sole regulatory control for the purposes of homeland security of the 
chemical facilities of concern located in that jurisdiction.   
The Advance Notice of Rulemaking, 6 CFR Part 27, Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards defines a “covered facility” to be a chemical facility determined by 
the Assistant Secretary to present high levels of security risk, or a facility that the 
Assistant Secretary has determined is presumptively high risk under Section 27.200.87  
Although there are multiple criteria that could potentially justify a determination of high 
risk, the first Top-screen question is whether the toxic release worst-case scenario as 
identified under the EPA Risk Management Program might expose a residential 
population greater than or equal to 200,000 persons.  The second question is whether a 
flammable release worst-case scenario might expose a residential population greater than 
or equal to 1,000 persons.  In the case of New Jersey, this consequence threshold would 
result in approximately 13 percent of the facilities subject to the NJTCPA program 
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potentially being a covered facility pursuant to 6 CFR Part 27.  It is logical that the DHS 
would set the regulation threshold at a very high level considering the vast number of 
chemical facilities throughout the country.  However, it is difficult to justify 87 percent of 
the universe being exempt from 6 CFR Part 27 considering that the majority of those 
facilities do have significant off site consequences even though they are less than 200,000 
and 1,000 persons for a toxic and flammable release, respectively.  Consideration should 
be given to reducing the toxic consequence to 20,000 persons to appropriately capture 
facilities that present a high level of security risk. 
The completion of the Top-screen should not be a one time process since facilities 
routinely change the amount and type of substances being stored and handled.  A 
requirement to update the Top-screen based upon submission of an updated RMP would 
ensure that the universe of covered facilities is accurate.  However, since RMPs are 
required to be updated for various reasons that would not affect the Top-screen, changes 
should be limited to those that increase or decrease the amount of extraordinarily 
hazardous substances on site, modify the off-site consequence analysis, or otherwise 
impact preparedness and response activities. 
Delegation will require the regulations to address an appropriate resource 
mechanism to provide the State agency in question adequate funding to implement an 
oversight program.  This could be accomplished through direct funding from the DHS, a 
fee based program assessing the companies in question based upon risk, or a combination 
thereof.  States such as New Jersey that have delegation status for the EPA Risk 
Management Program already have established fee structures in place for this universe of 
facilities which could be adjusted to account for the additional costs associated with 
administering chemical security standards. 
The question of Federal preemption will turn either on the application of implied 
preemption, or on the nature of any express preemption in 6 CFR Part 27.88  The 
principle of implied preemption is centered on the fact that no state or local authority can 
frustrate the purposes of a Federal law or regulatory program.  A state or local regulation 
                                                 
87 Department of Homeland Security, DHS-2006-0073, RIN 1601-AA41, 6 CFR Part 27, Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 73.  
88 Department of Homeland Security, DHS-2006-0073, RIN 1601-AA41, 6 CFR Part 27, Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 66. 
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may be preempted, for example, where that regulation conflicts with an activity or plan 
specifically approved under Federal law.89  Section 27.405 provides for the review and 
preemption of State laws and regulations by the Assistant Secretary.  The DHS will 
review State laws, administrative actions, or decisions or orders of a court under State 
law and regulations submitted under this section, and will opine whether – 
 (A) complying with the State law or regulation and a requirement of this Part is                       
      not possible; or 
(B) the application or enforcement of the State law or regulation would present an  
      obstacle to or frustrate the purposes of this Part.90 
An evaluation of the proposed preemption language by the Congressional 
Research Service determined that the proposed rule seems to imply that any state 
regulation that does require a specific security measure would be preempted.  If this 
proposed language is retained in the interim final rule, it seems likely that any existing 
state regulations, such as those in New Jersey, would be preempted by the performance-
based federal regulation.91 
It is imperative that States retain the ability to be more restrictive as appropriate to 
ensure that preparedness is measured in line with potential vulnerabilities. A one size fits 
all standard is not practical across our diverse nation. A minimum standard set by DHS 
will ensure a level playing field for the chemical industry with the understanding that 
jurisdictions with unique vulnerabilities have the ability to implement stricter standards to 
adequately safeguard their citizens. 
States, such as New Jersey, have taken critical steps to address chemical facility 
security well over three years ago.  It is recognized that most states have not taken similar 
action and therefore, federal regulations to create minimum national chemical facility 
standards is essential.  At the same time, it is also important not to penalize those pro-
active states and allow the states to retain the authority to adopt enhanced security 
requirements if states determine they are necessary.  No two states are alike, and the risks 
                                                 
89 Department of Homeland Security, DHS-2006-0073, RIN 1601-AA41, 6 CFR Part 27, Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 67. 
90 Ibid., 106. 
91 Dana A. Shea and Todd B. Tatelman, Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for 
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 7. 
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posed by every facility present unique challenges based on location, population size, and 
other factors.  Federal standards must be a floor ensuring a base level of protection, not a 
ceiling that constrains a State’s ability to protect its citizens. 
 
D. SCOPE OF UNIVERSE 
The chemical facilities subject to the EPA 112r requirements is a logical starting 
point in defining the universe of facilities subject to mandatory security requirements.  
However, the off site consequences of the 14,600 facilities storing extraordinarily 
hazardous substance vary significantly which demonstrate the need for a tiered regulatory 
approach.  A facility with the potential to impact a large metropolitan population should 
not be held to the same standard as one that would have no or limited off site 
consequences in the event of an accident or intentional attack.  
There are a number of EPA RMP facilities exempt from the proposed 6 CFR Part 
27 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards.  Pursuant to Section 550, the regulations 
will not apply to public water systems (as defined by section 1401 of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act) and water treatment works facilities (as defined by section 212 of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act).  Exempting public water systems and treatment works is 
not appropriate as these facilities many times pose a higher risk than sites currently 
captured under the DHS definition of a covered facility.  Unlike the mandatory programs 
in place at the exempted Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) facilities, the water and wastewater industries are 
only subject to voluntary standards which cannot be considered equivalent to that 
proposed under 6 CFR Part 27.  Since an equivalent security program is not in place for 
the water and wastewater industries, these facilities should not be exempt from the 
requirements of 6 CFR Part 27.  Facilities that present a high level of security risk should 
be subject to federal regulations, regardless of the industry in question, unless it can be 
demonstrated that equivalent mandatory requirements are already established. 
 A three tier proposal, defined as follows, would serve to address the degree of 
variation in the risk and consequence inherent within the chemical sector. 
• Tier 1 – Facilities that meet the covered facility definition currently 
proposed in 6 CFR Part 27. 
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• Tier 2 – Facilities that have EPA off site consequences but are not 
considered to be high risk facilities as defined by the DHS. 
• Tier 3 – Facilities that are subject to the EPA Risk Management Program 
but their worst case scenario does not result in any off site consequences. 
Tier 1 facilities would face the most stringent standards in terms of risk-based 
performance standards.  Criteria similar to that proposed in 6 CFR Part 27.230 would be 
appropriate for these facilities.  Part 27.230 requires each covered facility to select, 
develop, and implement measures designed to: 
1. secure and monitor the perimeter of the facility; 
2. secure and monitor restricted areas or potentially critical targets within the 
facility; 
3. control access to the facility and to restricted areas within the facility by 
screening and/or inspecting individuals and vehicles as they enter; 
4. deter vehicles from penetrating the facility perimeter, gaining 
unauthorized access to restricted areas or otherwise presenting a hazard to 
potentially critical targets; 
5. secure and monitor the shipping and receipt of hazardous materials for the 
facility; 
6. deter theft or diversion of potentially dangerous chemicals; 
7. deter insider sabotage; 
8. deter cyber sabotage, including by preventing unauthorized onsite or 
remote access to critical process controls, Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and other sensitive computerized systems; 
9. develop and exercise an emergency plan to respond to security incidents 
internally and with assistance of local law enforcement and first 
responders; 
10. maintain effective monitoring, communications and warning systems; 
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11. ensure proper security training, exercises, and drills of facility personnel; 
12. perform appropriate background checks on and ensure appropriate 
credentials for facility personnel, and as appropriate, for unescorted 
visitors with access to restricted areas or potentially critical targets; 
13. escalate the level of protective measures for periods of elevated threat; 
14. address specific threats, vulnerabilities or risks identified by the Assistant 
Secretary for the particular facility at issue; 
15. report significant security incidents to the Department; 
16. identify, investigate, report, and maintain records of significant security 
incidents and suspicious activities in or near the site; 
17. establish official(s) and an organization responsible for security and for 
compliance with these standards; 
18. maintain appropriate records; and 
19. address specific threats, vulnerabilities or risks identified by the Assistant 
Secretary for the particular facility at issue; 
20. address any additional performance standards the Assistant Secretary may 
specify.92 
Tier 2 facilities are defined as those facilities that have off-site consequences but 
are not considered to be high risk facilities pursuant to the DHS definition.  These 
facilities, although of less magnitude than the Tier 1 sites, have a significant potential for 
off-site impacts.  It is proposed that these sites be required to follow the same risk-based 
performance standards with the understanding that the implementation measures would 
not be required to be as robust as those of the high risk facilities.  It would be necessary 
to develop criteria of acceptable measures for Tier 2 sites.  A general example could be 
screening and/or inspecting individuals and vehicles as they enter the site.  An acceptable  
 
 
                                                 
92 Shea and Tatelman, Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress, 87. 
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Tier 1 approach would be inspecting personal identification and the vehicle itself while a 
Tier 2 site would be considered to be compliant with only protocol in place for individual 
inspection. 
Tier 3 sites are subject to the EPA Risk Management Program but do not have 
any off-site consequences.  The risk-based performance standards for this tier would 
focus on training, exercising, and background checks.  Although controlling access and 
methods to deter threats are not emphasized for this tier, such measures could be required 
based upon the results of the security vulnerability analysis.  Following the previous 
example for the Tier 1 facilities, the modified Tier 3 standards may include: 
1. develop and exercise an emergency plan to respond to security incidents 
internally and with assistance of local law enforcement and first 
responders; 
2. maintain effective monitoring, communications and warning systems; 
3. ensure proper security training, exercises, and drills of facility personnel; 
4. perform appropriate background checks on and ensure appropriate 
credentials for facility personnel, and as appropriate, for unescorted 
visitors with access to restricted areas or potentially critical targets; 
5. escalate the level of protective measures for periods of elevated threat; 
6. address specific threats, vulnerabilities or risks identified by the Assistant 
Secretary for the particular facility at issue; 
7. report significant security incidents to the Department; 
8. identify, investigate, report, and maintain records of significant security 
incidents and suspicious activities in or near the site; 
9. establish official(s) and an organization responsible for security and for 
compliance with these standards; 
10. maintain appropriate records; and 
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11. address specific threats, vulnerabilities or risks identified by the Assistant 
Secretary for the particular facility at issue; 
12. address any additional performance standards the Assistant Secretary may 
specify. 
 
E. PUBLIC PREPARATION 
Determination of the appropriate role and responsibility of government and the 
chemical industry in preparing the public for a terrorist attack against critical chemical 
sector infrastructure is important to the success of any regulatory initiative.  The 
implementation of effective preparedness and response protocols are critical to avoid 
confusion and panic, a primary goal of most terrorist organizations.  Historically, the 
response plans in place at chemical facilities are a collaborative effort between the private 
sector, government agencies, and the local emergency response organizations. In general, 
the public has played no active role in this process or participates in the annual drills to 
exercise the plans.  An incident of such magnitude that the vulnerability exceeds over 
1,000,000 people will quickly exceed the capabilities of dedicated response resources.  
Therefore, it is necessary engage the public in the planning process to reduce the threat of 
panic, confusion, and distrust of government direction to shelter in place or evacuate.  
Research on population responses to a wide range of natural and technological disasters 
suggests that there is a tendency toward adaptability and cooperation.93  In addition, 
nonprofessionals in the immediate vicinity have saved the majority of people rescued in 
disasters, greatly aiding the work of the professionals who respond.94 
In order to minimize disruption of daily routines and promote community 
cohesion it is necessary to adequately communicate the worst case scenarios that may 
result from a terrorist attack on a local chemical facility.  The evaluation of worst case 
scenarios is required by EPA under the Clean Air Act Section 112r.  Based upon the 
largest vessel on site releasing its entire contents within 10 minutes, a plume model is 
developed specific to the hazardous substance in question to generate an estimated 
                                                 
93 Thomas A. Glass and Monica Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a 
City against Panic,” Confronting Biological Weapons (Baltimore, MD: Infectious Diseases Society of 
America, January 15, 2002). 
94 Ibid. 
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population amount in the vulnerability zone.  These off site consequence analyses are not 
available to the public but can be viewed under certain conditions through EPA reading 
rooms.  Access restrictions are logical as this information is sensitive and would be a 
valuable planning tool to a terrorist organization.  However, the lack of this information 
in the public domain can have serious implications in any response scenario.  The 
recommended action protocol can vary greatly depending on the specific hazardous 
substance of concern. 
Timely and consistent communication of information regarding the prevention of 
terrorist attacks may help alleviate fear and anxiety and provide confidence in the 
government’s ability to protect the public.95  Limited information on the types of 
chemical threats in their neighborhood and the appropriate responses to safeguard 
yourself and loved ones will intensify fear and anxiety within the community.  Results 
revealed that those experiencing more anger had more optimistic beliefs and those 
experiencing fear had more pessimistic beliefs about risks from both terror and non terror 
related events.96  The goal should be to provide sufficient information that educates 
populations about expectable responses and coping strategies to increase community 
resilience.  It is important to note that an appropriate balance must be struck to ensure 
that the information is provided in such a context to not divulge unnecessarily any 
sensitive data that could be used for malicious purposes. 
The lack of transparency of certain aspects of government regulatory oversight of 
the chemical industry has led to distrust of the industry in general and particularly the 
private sector motivation to adequately protect the surrounding community from a 
catastrophic release of a hazardous substance.  The protection of sensitive information, 
arguably a necessity in consideration of the threat of terrorism, has added to the 
perception that the first priority of industry is to maximize profit and minimize security 
enhancements that require significant investment.   
Communicable industry metrics are necessary to alleviate concerns that industry 
is not proactively and effectively addressing security issues and that appropriate 
                                                 
95 National Academy of Sciences, Developing Strategies for Minimizing the Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorism Through Prevention, Intervention, and Health Promotion (Washington, D.C.: 
The National Academies Press, 2003), 118, available at: http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10717.html 
(Accessed December 11, 2006). 
96 Ibid., 119. 
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government agencies are actively involved in the oversight of these initiatives.  Open 
communication channels with community leaders will not only have a positive effect on 
increasing knowledge and trust but will also increase the effectiveness of future 
regulatory proposals addressing chemical industry security.   
The chemical industry, from a process safety standpoint, is heavily regulated by 
various Federal and state agencies.  As a result, all facilities of concern have detailed 
emergency response plans in place and are required to annually exercise these plans.  
Originally, these plans considered only accidental releases but incorporating terrorism 
aspects did not require significant resources as the response actions are very similar.  
However, strong public opinion that greater effort is necessary to adequately protect the 
chemical infrastructure from terrorism has led to P.L. 109-125 which requires DHS to 
promulgate chemical security standards no later than April 4, 2007.  Professionals have 
made the argument that public risk perceptions are irrational but regardless there is a 
benefit to take appropriate regulatory action.  In a democracy, interventions that address 
misguided fears of a majority, or at least a large number of citizens, are legitimate even if 
only anxiety is reduced and objective threat reduction is negligible.97 
Risk perceptions and many other judgments are guided by heuristics, implicit and 
intuitive shortcuts, which often contrast dramatically with the logical, probability-based 
analytical process employed by professional experts.98  However, the public is at a 
distinct disadvantage as the majority of the information necessary to make a reasonable 
risk assessment in regards to the chemical industry is not in the public domain.  Off site 
consequences and the results of various plume models are only available through EPA 
reading rooms and the inputs to those models are not always provided.  In addition, the 
complexity of the modeling and the underlying assumptions are many times difficult for 
the average individual to comprehend.  In many cases the only exposure to vulnerability 
analyses of the chemical industry is through media accounts which very often provide  
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inaccurate or at least information out of context which serves to increase fear, anxiety, 
and distrust with the private sector and government agencies charged with regulatory 
oversight. 
Access to accurate information, the ability to have an active role in preparedness 
exercises, and understanding the potential response actions are all vital to public trust, 
support for government policy, and minimizing loss of life due to an actual terrorist 
event.  There are obviously limitations on the type of information and the detail of such 
that can be shared with the public, the role that members of the public can play during 
exercises, and the fact that a true catastrophic event will result in casualties.  The 
following three steps are recommended to provide the public with realistic risk 
information, an active role in preparedness activities, and an understanding of their role 
and responsibilities should an attack occur in their neighborhood.  Public participation in 
dealing with community disasters has repeatedly been shown to bolster public morale and 
ameliorate psychological stress – from the bombings in London during World War II to 
the modern day Israeli/Palestinian conflict.99  
 
1. Information Sharing 
Public forums for interested citizens living in EPA RMP vulnerability zones 
would provide a reasonable baseline understanding of the potential impacts of a chemical 
release, whether accidental or intentional, on their community.  It may not be practical to 
conduct these forums for each chemical facility as industrialized areas many times are 
located within the vulnerability zones of multiple chemical facilities.  County wide 
forums may be the most logical approach as this is consistent with emergency response 
organization structures outside of large metropolitan areas.  The forums could be chaired 
by appropriate local government officials with participation by the affected chemical 
companies.  The forum should provide a general understanding of the facilities in the 
area, the hazardous substances of concern, and the plans in place to respond in the event 
of an incident.  An open dialogue with questions from the public will allow the 
government officials to appropriately focus the meeting on the specific concerns of the 
community.  Educating the public and addressing their concerns to the maximum extent 
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possible will serve to empower the community and provide a sense of control over their 
own destiny should such a catastrophe occur.  Alleviating the fear of the unknown and a 
sense of helplessness surrounding an act of terrorism will greatly benefit existing 
preparedness initiatives. 
 
2.  Public Preparedness Role 
In general, chemical industry emergency response exercises do not have active 
participation from the local community, except for the emergency responders in the area.  
This void is important as there is no metric to determine if the communication channels 
are truly effective and that the message is being understood and appropriately 
implemented.  It is obviously not practical to have full scale notifications or mock 
evacuations during each drill but a representative sample of individuals will provide a 
valuable benchmark.  Communication methods such as reverse 911, siren activations, 
media broadcasts, and other alert mechanisms can be improved with public involvement 
focused on deficiencies of the existing protocol and areas of the community that are not 
being reached.  This change can be implemented through regulatory amendments that add 
public representation to the various agencies that are currently required to play a role in 
the annual response exercises. 
 
3.  Potential Response Actions 
The determination of the appropriate recommended protective actions in the event 
of a hazardous chemical release is not only dependent upon the amount, duration, and 
weather conditions but also the substance in question.  Therefore, the public needs to be 
well aware of the types of substances that they could be exposed to and the range of 
protective actions that may be recommended by government officials.  In many cases, not 
adhering to the specific government direction potentially results in putting yourself in 
harms way.  An example would be the tracking of a release plume.  The plume will 
probably cover approximately one-sixth of the vulnerability zone and those individuals 
may be directed to evacuate.  The remaining population would be directed to shelter in 
place but if they choose to evacuate anyway it very well could be into the direction of the 
plume or at least hinder those individuals that were appropriately ordered to evacuate.  
Therefore, if the community understands the decision making process that results in 
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protective action recommendations individuals would be more likely to respond 
appropriately.  Providing the large picture with the facts necessary to understand how an 
event is likely to unfold and educating the community on their roles and responsibilities 
will strengthen cohesion and resilience in the vulnerability zone. 
As can be seen, these recommendations are very broad and there will be many 
obstacles to overcome at the detail level prior to implementation.  However, it is clear 
that the best laid chemical industry preparedness and response plans are less effective 
without incorporating the public into the process.  Building trust and confidence in 
government policy is vital to reducing the fear and anxiety inherent to acts of terrorism.  
There is no expectation that planning, capital investments, and response resources can 
eliminate the potential for terrorism but reactions of anger and optimism instead of fear 
and pessimism are within our reach.   
 
F. INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY 
The implementation of Inherently Safer Technology (IST) has clearly led to 
increased process safety and reduced risk throughout the chemical industry.  It is 
important to understand the distinction between the evaluation of IST alternatives and the 
requirement of implementation of such alternatives in terms of government regulation.  
The New Jersey Standards, for example, required only the evaluation of potential 
alternatives and did not require implementation, only justification from the owner as to 
why implementation was not practical at that their site.  Mandatory implementation is not 
feasible in an industry that is so diverse in terms materials and products, and so complex 
in terms of chemistry and operations.  However, the evaluation of IST, as was 
demonstrated in New Jersey is not a significant hardship for the chemical industry. 
The significant difference with IST is that it is primarily a process safety function 
which does have ancillary homeland security benefits.  However, it is not appropriate or 
effective to include IST within chemical security standards.  There are overlaps between 
security and process safety but the training and experience necessary to become skilled in 
these areas is quite different.  Therefore, it is recommended that future IST regulatory 
efforts be guided and implemented by the EPA and those States delegated the 
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responsibility for implementation of the Clean Air Act Section 112r.  It would be 
necessary to ensure that there is nothing in an IST regulation that would frustrate the 
purposes of 6 CFR Part 27. 
It is proposed that IST evaluation be required for all facilities subject to the EPA 
Risk Management Program.  Similar to the New Jersey Standards, companies would be 
required to evaluate IST alternatives across their entire operations.  IST is defined as the 
principles or techniques incorporated in a covered process to minimize or eliminate the 
potential for an EHS accident that include, but are not limited to, the following: 1) 
reducing the amount of EHS material that may be released; 2) substituting less hazardous 
materials; 3) using EHSs in the least hazardous process conditions or form; 4) designing 
equipment and processes to minimize the potential for equipment failure and human 
error.  This review must also include an analysis of whether the adoption of IST 
alternatives is practicable and the basis for any determination that implementation of IST 
is impractical. 
In addition to specific items that must be taken into consideration as part of an 
IST evaluation, reasonable criteria must be established to determine practicality.  This is 
difficult to prescribe in a regulatory structure but is imperative to ensure that all sites are 
held to a similar standard.  Anticipated reasons for a determination that an alternative is 
impractical may include cost, efficiency, product quality, and similar negative effects on 
the current business activity.  An appeal mechanism would also be necessary to provide 
owners an avenue to contest a determination that the basis for an impractical decision is 
not acceptable. 
The background and experience to be considered a process safety expert and 
qualified to conduct the IST evaluation must be defined by regulation.  These individuals 
could be employed by the site, corporate staff, or independent consultants but must have 
the ability to demonstrate proficiency in this area.  It is very possible that the same 
individuals that completed the process hazard analyses and other risk management 
program items will similarly meet the qualifications to conduct and IST evaluation.  
The results of the New Jersey Standards demonstrated the positive effects of 
simply evaluating IST alternatives.  There are a number of facilities that evaluate IST as 
part of their standard operating procedures and would therefore not be significantly 
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impacted by regulatory requirements.  The largest benefit from IST requirements is 
driving those companies that have not historically considered process safety alternatives 
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